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THE SACRIFICE OF BARBARA

BY F. C. S. SCHILLER

It would seem that the old adage "it never rains but it pours" applies, not only to the tropics, but also to the supercelestial regions where Pure Thought subsists on the suprasensible aether and deathless Forms are gorged with nectar and ambrosia. For some time now rumors of commotions and strange innovations in these exalted regions have been wafted down to earth. Euclid's three dimensions no longer seemed to satisfy the requirements of pure geometry nor to fill the maw of space-time; the pure Forms of Plato and the apodictic proofs of Aristotle were no longer "words of power" and terms to conjure with; while Einstein was ousting Newton as the cornerstone of physics. On earth, of course, the Titans had long been in revolt, piling Pelion on Ossa, and performing other gigantic feats of engineering; but the realms of Eternal Truth had seemed unshaken, even when certain sages began to think "dangerous thoughts." They were not really to be feared, so long as their heresies remained too abstruse to be teachable, and no textbooks were extant to divulge their mysteries.

But now the supercelestial region is torn by a convulsion unequalled since the day when Zeus dethroned and mutilated his father Cronus. Already the Revolution is descending from the Academic World into the campus, if not into the market-place, and threatening to end the long reign of Barbara. Barbara, be it said, denotes a pet name for the old Formal Logic, which has been an ingredient in liberal educa-

tion for above two millennia and notoriously was "neither a science nor an art but only a dodge," that is, a pretty harmless and moderately entertaining word-game, which could be taught to sophomores.

Poor Barbara is now in an evil plight. For, by what seems not accident but a fell design, she is falling a victim to fierce attacks, launched simultaneously from Cambridge, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts. With one accord two doughty champions of Symbolic Logic, Professor R. M. Eaton of Harvard and Miss L. S. Stebbing of Girton (and now of Bedford) College, both in a manner disciples of Professor A. N. Whitehead and Earl Russell, and both filled with holy zeal to substitute for Barbara as queen of the realm of knowledge the Sacred Scriptures of Whitehead and Russell, have written twin logics, amounting to nearly twelve hundred pages of printed matter, with a similar purpose and a similar title.¹

One cannot doubt the grim determination of their attack. By their concerted efforts they have dragged their victim, weakened for centuries by the preliminary tortures of the Thousand Cuts, down to the Altar of Science, and stretched her helpless on the Stone of Sacrifice. Already one can see them brandishing their glassy, obsidian knives, tearing Barbara's heart out of her breast and displaying it in gory triumph before a frantic academic crowd that hails such ritual murders as the fancied panacea for their intellectual ills!

But the humaner eye of a less heathen logic shrinks with horror from the hideous fanaticism of these Aztec rites. For it foresees, all too clearly, that this will not be the end of it. The fate of Barbara is only a beginning. She will not be the only victim when a fanatic Formalism begins to prey upon its kith and kin. Thousands of innocent students of philosophy in her train are doomed to suffer untold agonies from the pedant cult that insists upon turning the Altar of Science into

¹*General Logic, An Introductory Survey.* By RALPH M. EATON. New York. Chas. Scribners' Sons. 1931. Pp. xii, 630.

A Modern Introduction to Logic. By L. S. STEBBING. New York. T. Y. Crowell Co. 1931. Pp. xviii, 505.

a Stone of Sacrifice. I am more solicitous to alleviate their fate than to rescue Barbara, who after all does not belong to the mortal realm, was never very much better than she should be, and throughout her long reign often abused her power.

Moreover, behind the question how much technicality students of logic should be made to suffer looms a larger issue. Ought not teachers of philosophy to realize that their subject is already perilously near the danger-point at which a subject grows unteachable? And ought they not to beware of pushing it over the brink? Of course the reply will be forthcoming that if science demands the sacrifice, if precision of thought can be attained at no smaller cost, no regard for the consequences, no consideration for the human weaknesses of students, must stay the hands of the high priests of inexorable science. But if Philosophy goes over the brink and is precipitated into the limbo of obsolete and futile subtleties, will not all the values of which we believe it to be the vehicle perish with it? Such are the considerations which move me to inquire whether logic is truly a science which must be worshipped with human (and indeed superhuman) sacrifices, and whether Symbolic Logic is a real advance in logic, and is not rather a cruel and needless superstition of the Academic Grove.

I

Before discussing this question, however, I should make it plain that I do not wish to cast any slur on the two books under review. I have great respect both for Miss Stebbing and for Professor Eaton, and think that both have written good books, which display competent workmanship. If I had to use them as textbooks for teaching logic, I should be hard put to it to choose between them. For both are Formal logicians who have taken refuge in Symbolic Logic to escape from the whims of Barbara. Both have made gallant attempts to infuse logical order into the chaos of logical tradition, and to make a teachable extract from Symbolic Logic. Both moreover have had to compromise with the rigor of their ideal of Logic as the science of pure Form. Both have introduced full,

and perhaps excessive, expositions of the vagaries of Barbara, though they heartily despise them, and both have done homage to the insistent demand for a logic of scientific method, to the extent of discussing the problems of "inductive" logic, though both admit in handsome terms that its processes cannot be represented as purely formal.

For example Professor Eaton confesses that "natural science cannot be made completely deductive" (p. 583), that "induction yields proofs of probability rather than truth" (p. 488), and that "in no case is the probability of an induction *exactly* measurable" (p. 495), and that "the truth-frequency of any class of propositions is to be determined by empirical observations" (p. 493). Similarly Miss Stebbing, after declaring that "logic is purely formal" (p. 478) and that the logician "emphasizes the distinction between pure and empirical science: in the former demonstration is possible; in the latter it is not" (p. 493), confesses that "the problem of the logical justification of induction is not one that need concern the scientist" (p. 492), that only "in so far as scientific method exhibits form is it the proper concern of the logician," and that "every modern logician recognizes that the foundation of the theory of induction is to be found in the theory of probability" (p. 493).

Despite these admissions both Professor Eaton and Miss Stebbing have many acute and interesting things to say about scientific procedure. But should it not have occurred to them that they ought to have ruled out induction altogether as unamenable to form and therefore extralogical? Ruthless excision of all "inductive" matter would have greatly purified the form of both these treatises on Symbolic Logic.

II

I am not concerned to deny that on the ground it shares with Barbara Symbolic Logic carries "analysis" further, even though the analysis of both be only verbal. On that ground it can make a number of unanswerable criticisms of the arbitrary restrictions, such as that of valid reasoning to the subject-

predicate relation, which have determined what topics should receive treatment in Formal Logic. So I am quite willing to admit that Symbolic Logic is a more perfectly formal form of Formal Logic. But what I boggle at, and what I think all Formal logicians need to justify, is the foundation of their structures. I question their fundamental abstraction of "form" apart from "matter" and the set of assumptions they have chosen to build their science upon. And particularly I complain of their neglect to *state*, candidly and completely, the abstractions on which they have built. It is their *philosophic* or epistemological basis which seems to me so incomplete and insecure.

Now on this matter I get little help either from Miss Stebbing or from Professor Eaton. Both seem to me (1) to rule out and beg unjustifiably, uncritically and dogmatically, a number of questions that ought to have been cleared up, (2) to omit many questions that ought to have been argued, and (3) to use many notions to which they are not entitled.

III

I will take as examples of the first defect the treatment of the notions of Logic and of truth (and falsity). Both Professor Eaton and Miss Stebbing assume that Formal Logic is possible and must be the only logic worthy of the name; but by neither is this choice at all adequately defended. Professor Eaton devotes to it only one brief paragraph (p. 4) which admits that there is a psychological and philosophical background even to Formal Logic. Miss Stebbing hardly admits even this. She conceives Logic as "the science of pure form" (p. 486) and holds that "all demonstration is purely formal, so that the *validity* of reasoning with regard to any matter of fact is wholly dependent upon the *formal* properties of the objects that enter into the reasoning" (p. 487). It is grudgingly admitted that "the logician also may have to take note of psychological processes" (p. 473) and that inference is a mental process which would be irrelevant if Logic were strictly confined to the theory of propositional forms (p. 210); but "its

validity depends upon conditions that are logical" (p. 211). "Validity" and "truth" are said to be "quite different" (p. 246), but the existence (or occurrence) of validity is taken for granted. As for truth "we need not attempt to discuss the problem as to what is meant by a *true* proposition" (*ibid.*). I can imagine no discussion more vitally necessary to Symbolic Logic.

From all this I should conclude that the systematic status of Logic is a very burning question, and that to neglect it is anything but scientific.

IV

I do not expect Formal logicians to agree, but at any rate they will find it hard to evade an admission that the present status of *truth* in logic is something of a scandal. What is meant by "truth," and what are its relations to "validity"? Has Formal Logic any use for "truth" at all? Does truth of pure "form" occur at all? Is it even conceivable? In what sense or senses is truth claimed by judgments, propositions and propositional functions? These surely are vital questions to which every logic should provide a coherent answer.

Symbolic Logic in particular seems bound, not merely to assume that true propositions exist, but also to clear up their relations to the truth of judgments and of propositional functions. On this question its attitude appears to be obscure and inconsistent.

(1) Its initial difficulty is to explain how true propositions can be distinguished from false merely *by their form*. For false propositions also formally claim truth. Hence the formal truth-claim which inheres in a proposition as a verbal formula must not be confused with real truth. For else there would be no false propositions.

(2) Next there arises the difficulty of determining the *meaning* of a proposition. Before we can inquire whether it is true, we must discover what it means, and realize that it may be true in one sense and use, and false in others. The question of *meaning* clearly takes precedence over that of truth.

Now it is soon seen that meaning depends on *use*. Apart from its use the proposition is a form of words which mean *potentially*; but their actual meaning can only be determined when they are used in a context; it is only then that they convey truth or falsity. Hence all words and all propositions are to be deemed (potentially) "ambiguous." They may be used in different senses, and these must be ascertained before their truth-claim can be discussed. Moreover these possible senses are innumerable and inexhaustible. For even if we had catalogued all *past* uses, we could not foresee to what future uses a proposition might not be put. Further, because every proposition can be used so as to convey truth, it can be *misused* to convey falsehood. So, in its use, it may become false. Logically, therefore, every proposition should be regarded as both true *and* (at least potentially) false, and as infinitely "ambiguous" besides.

This infinite "ambiguity" of the proposition is however better called its *plurality of senses*. For what it means is that a form of words can turn, in use, into an indefinite plurality of *judgments*. The reason therefore why one cannot say of a proposition *what it means* is that in ultimate analysis there is no "it."

A judgment, however, is clearly in a different position. It is a personal act of thought which uses the verbal form called a "proposition" in a definite spatio-temporal context. It is a personal truth-claim, advanced by some one at some time and place, for some purpose. It is an event, and its truth is relative to its occasion. To eternal truth it lays no claim, for it does not inhabit the fabulous realm of timeless subsistence. What it means, and whether it is true, are always questions of actual fact. It may be obscure and really ambiguous, if it is not understood, or if intended equivocally; but most judgments *are* understood, and ambiguity is not inherent in the judgment, as plurality of senses is in the proposition.

A propositional function is conceived by Symbolic Logic as a formula capable of becoming a proposition when determinate

values are assigned to the "*variables*" it contains. Its (meaning and) value will thus depend on the values given to its terms. Symbolic Logic appears to be in doubt whether truth should be predicated of propositional functions. As a rule it is stated that "these schematic forms are neither true nor false" and that "any expression that might conceivably be sometimes true and sometimes false is not a proposition, but a propositional function," whereas "it is characteristic of a proposition . . . that if it is true or false, it is true or false once and for all."² Miss Stebbing however mentions "a propositional function that is always true" (p. 225), and Professor Eaton also alludes to this possibility (p. 448). But this doctrine seems hard to justify. For it would mean that one could not give values to the variables of a propositional function such as to produce false propositions; or in other words that a propositional function cannot be misapplied.

V

In view of these dicta can it be maintained that Symbolic Logic has any clear conception of truth that applies unambiguously to propositional functions, propositions, and judgments? It seems impossible in the first place really to separate "propositions" from propositional functions. For actually all the terms of a proposition, being "ambiguous," would seem to be "variables." Their meaning, and so the truth of the proposition, seems to depend on the values assigned to its constituent terms. It suffices to point to the enormous variability of a proposition in which "Nero" figures, according as "Nero" refers to a Roman Emperor or a colored slave, to a black dog or a cat. Certainly then propositions are "sometimes true and sometimes false" and Professor Eaton's propositions that are "true or false once and for all" are a myth. No one has ever devised a form of words that could not be used ambiguously, and misused.

The proposition altogether is a very anomalous affair. So soon as it is used, it turns into a judgment, so soon as it goes

²Eaton, pp. 391, 362.

out of use, it turns into a verbal formula or string of words whose meaning admits of infinite variation. May we not conclude that propositions merge into propositional functions and, strictly speaking, do not exist at all? Are they not just fictions devised for the uses of Formal Logic, and would it not be far wiser to found logic on judgments, which are at any rate observable psychic facts?

VI

But even if Formal Logic finds propositions such convenient counters in its word-game that it cannot bear to drop them, it must at least be summoned to cease from confusing the "truth" of propositions with that of judgments. The difference in the ways in which "truth" can be predicated in these two cases would seem to be plain. The one thing a proposition cannot be is what it is always *assumed* to be: it is not true *or* false. A proposition is *both* true *and* false, or *neither*: it is the former when regarded as a form-to-be-used (variously); it is the latter when it is recognized as a "propositional function." A judgment on the other hand is always definitely either true or false, according as it is the best available solution of the problem that provoked it or not. Again the "ambiguity" to which a proposition is liable is really a "*plurality of senses*," i. e. of the uses to which it may be put. It is (potentially) universal, because it inheres in its "form," and in the usefulness of language; but it is no obstacle to its actual use. The fact that a proposition may be used in *n* senses need not hinder me in apprehending the sense in which it *is* used on a given occasion. In a judgment on the other hand ambiguity, when it occurs, is a serious blemish, because it may baffle understanding.

This duplicity of "truth" in Formal Logic Professor Eaton has the grace to admit. He says (p. 16) "the adjectives true, false, doubtful, impossible, though they are applied to judgments, do not characterize this act in the same sense as they do propositions." To remedy this he proposes to call judgments *correct* or *mistaken* rather than true or false (p. 17). To this proposal I must demur. Linguistically, "correct"

seems better suited to express formal validity than truth. Moreover Formal Logic really has as little need for "truth" as our actual thinking has for "formal validity." Justice would be done therefore if this latter term were left to Formal Logic while "truth" was reserved for judgments. Formal Logic could then be allowed to play about with "validity" to its heart's content and might even refrain from confusing it with truth.

VII

Of fundamental questions which Formal Logic ought to have discussed for the sake of thoroughness, I will only mention a few. Is it really possible to abstract the pure form of reasoning and to base a science on it? Is it really permissible to suppose, with Miss Stebbing (p. 133), that by substituting symbols "precise, i. e. well-defined and therefore unambiguous," for words the haunting wraith of ambiguity can be laid forever? If so, why is it that controversies about the meanings of its most vital terms, like "implication," can break out even in Symbolic Logic? Is it really possible to rule out the psychic side of thought, and to ignore the conceptions of purpose, satisfaction, selection, relevance and the rest, which refer to it? If it is possible, why is no attempt ever made to show *how* it is possible, and why do not Formal Logicians find it possible to get along without constant references to the topics they taboo?

VIII

This question brings us to the third item of the program sketched at the end of section II. I notice that Miss Stebbing makes constant and effective use of conceptions like relevance, selection, purpose, context, et cetera, which appear to be incompatible with any Formal Logic, though they do not figure in her (fairly full) Index. Professor Eaton is hardly less prone to do the same thing. He assures us (p. 412) that "whatever being a class has springs from the *relevance* of universals to individuals," but devotes no consideration to the logic of relevance, or to the other pragmatic conceptions he

feels prompted to use (cp. pp. 580-3). And he also does not allow them to sully the formal orthodoxy of his Index. Now in itself it is no matter for regret when the practice of philosophers is better than their theory. But in what are professedly theories of Symbolic Logic some little apology would seem to be needed for the intrusion of these strange and extraneous notions. It is not enough to keep them out of the Index. There should be, if not some acknowledgment of their sources, at all events some excuse for their introduction, and some little reflection on their compatibility with the rest of the treatise. It is a pity on all grounds that both Professor Eaton and Miss Stebbing prefer to *use* the conceptions of an alien logic rather than to *explain* them; and it is still more of a pity that neither of them takes any interest in the processes by which human knowledge is actually augmented. For had they done so, they could not have failed to observe that these processes have no resemblance to anything with which any sort of Formal Logic is concerned.

ILLUSION

BY JOHN RICHARD MORELAND

Once thought I death's chill space a place of dread
And shuddered when man spake of treading it,
Till one I love with laughing lips of red
Passed through to golden lands and exquisite.

No longer can the narrow grave affright
Since her loved form has hallowed its dark space,
'Tis now a shadowy gateway low and straight
That leads unto her happy dwelling-place.

BULL-ROARING AMERICA

BY THE EDITOR

Travellers tell us that in the African jungle there is an organized system by which the women and children are kept in subjection. Whenever there are lurking symptoms of revolt from the tyranny of chiefs or medicine men, certain men of the tribe are deputed to sneak into the wilderness at night and by means of clackers, drums and various devices to set up such unearthly noises that those not in on the secret become thoroughly terrorized. The effect is heightened by attributing the noises to offended spirits or the gods and dwelling upon the threatening dangers which they portend. The system is known as "bull-roaring."

To the thoughtless the suggestion that the same means has become largely the method of modern society may seem incredible. Nevertheless, a painstaking examination of the social, political and religious customs at present in vogue will, we believe, bear out the contention that there is at least systematized and in some instances organized effort in this land of ours, to stifle initiative, to prevent new ideas, to curb that freedom of speech and press for which our fathers fought, to fasten upon us old forms of thought by a modern and American system of "bull-roaring."

There are signs on the horizon, though slight, that the system has shot its bolt and is due for a loss of power over the public mind. The complete collapse of the system is certain to be accomplished, once the rank and file of the terrorized community can be apprised that the noises are not made by the disembodied spirits of our Colonial ancestors nor the falling debris of our western civilization, but simply by interested parties who are grown fat upon the *status quo* and are against any change.

The trouble with the average man of us who has not been too busy (buying and paying for the family car, and the radio, and the electric refrigerator, and the washing-machine) to

think, is that we have imagined "bull-roaring" to be the exclusive device of the jungle or of Medieval Europe, a great way off in distance or in time. We have scarcely realized the terror that was to come upon us. Perhaps like the African women and children we have more or less sympathized with the system so long as it was used to intimidate those that disagreed with us and while we were in connivance with the intimidators. To give a little attention to this may stir valorous fears and doubts within us, but they cannot be worse than those we suffer from and which are now become fairly universal.

Of course you would expect me to mention first the reckless racketeering and "bull-roaring" that has long obtained in the realm of theology. A host of people will subscribe to a word against religion who, if they were to read this article, would, after praising these restrictions on religion, lay it down in fury later on.

"Bull-roaring" has been a common device of professional religionists from the time of the first Shaman until our own day. The reason here as elsewhere is to be found in that mental laziness which refuses to revise conceptions already arrived at. It is far easier to fall back upon ready-made, hand-me-down thinking than it is to take out the intellectual scissors and cut us out a garment of new cloth. We prefer the misfit of a garment made for us by some infallible authority of Pope or Church or Book, to the danger of spoiling the cloth. So we live on the unchanging pabulum of religious fly-by-nights. In either case we know nothing of religion as an experience rising out of the depths of our own hearts and minds and therefore resting in imperturbable personal *convictions*. We have possessed a religion, but can scarcely contend that it has possessed us. It matters little whether we call ourselves fundamentalists or modernists or, to use the ambiguous title now in vogue, humanists. We have not only all of us fallen short of the glory of God, but we have all of us shown intolerance, ignorance and lack of deep thought. In either of these cases

we have been trying to enroll people under our banner not by calm discussion of the points involved, not by the dynamic or godly example, but by the shallow device of "bull-roaring." It matters little whether in the one case we have held the faltering line by the fear of Hell-fire or the wrath of infallible authority, we have depended upon the cheap, easy and dishonest method of terror and we are reaping our rewards. If we take the other case we are no better off. For the last half-century at least the dried-bladder-filled-with-fears, which has rattled the waddling geese into fixed ways of thinking, has been the charge of being unscientific. This is as powerful an idea in the present as was the charge of heresy in the Medieval society. Here again, the appeal has not been made to the deep-seated and incontestable values of religion at all, but to the agreement or disagreement of theological statements with scientific dogmas considered infallible and eternal, but which were in reality as ephemeral as the changing thought of man. By charges of ignorance and unprogressiveness and lack of science, which is his only God, the Humanist has attempted to line up the populace under his banner.

The case for Science itself has been very similar, though it calls for some hardihood to express it, since the very name "science" has become so sacrosanct that it is not in good form publicly or privately to question the philosophic method, principles or even the wildest imaginings of any man who claims to be a scientist. Real science is suffering from this condition at the present time in an exactly analogous way to that in which religion has suffered from those who had no knowledge of it but used it as the cloak under which they could spread individual sophistries. The day is coming, perhaps, when a considerable number of people will be able to distinguish between science, which is a knowledge of facts, and the various theories or philosophies which are set forth to explain those facts. In the meantime we shall have a goodly measure of "bull-roaring." Men who do not swallow unthinkingly the newest

scientific philosophy will continue to be charged with ignorance and bigotry.

Similar conditions might be cited in the field of education where the tyranny of accepted theory rules practically unquestioned. Few educators dare lift the sword against the assumptions of behaviourism and naturalism, yet most of them are conscious of the disastrous failure of the attempt to treat individuals as machines. The method has a way of debasing genius and individual initiative to the dead level of the dullest. Yet so sublime is our confidence in a theory accepted that we would question everything else without thinking to ask whether our educational theory agrees with the facts. If there are here and there some threatened uprisings, some signs of life, these are quickly stilled by turning on the educational clacker.

There is not space in this paper to discuss the bull-roaring system as it is applied in the fields of literature and art. Here America wavers between a superiority and an inferiority complex. Our shirt-sleeve diplomats who chewed tobacco and swore in "dings," "dangs" and "goshes," were quite as human and lovable as their European contemporaries, and as respectable. To think otherwise is to assume that culture can be had by taking off our cow-hide boots and rolling down our trousers. Mr. Babbitt Lewis has expressed well for us our shame and our inferiority complex and Europe has rewarded him handsomely because it likes to recognize our inferiority, but there is no reason why we should ape European ways or be bull-dozed out of the exercise of our American individuality. The percentage of hypocrites remains about the same around the world.

If the cases so far cited appear to be trivial or inconsequential, one needs only to look into the wide-spread acceptance of "bull-roaring" as a means of government to understand how for a presumably enlightened people it may have a serious aspect. In our great cities the people do palpably appear to have lost or resigned sovereignty. Perhaps this is due to the

resignation in which we have ceased political thinking altogether and have allowed ourselves to be propagandized into or out of the most important government undertakings. Here the superficial and doctrinaire nature of our thinking is much in evidence. The more far-fetched the appeal the more powerful. We are afraid of the deeper and darker depths of the jungle. The distance from which the sounds emerge adds much to their eeriness and terror. One of our largest cities maintained for years a grafting administration that plundered the public wealth and debased its school system on the plea of hostility toward King George. Likewise we are afraid to tackle enterprises of social amelioration for fear of Communism, of which there is not the slightest danger as long as we allow free speech and insist on justice and equality of all men before the law. Just now we are being "bull-roared" into a denial of these fundamental constitutional guarantees. We need to understand that free speech and individual rights are not matters that can be granted one class of citizens and denied another without forsaking representative forms of government for out-and-out oligarchy. If we are to be ruled by whatever section of society owns the largest number of newspapers or makes the most noise our liberties are gone, even though at present those forces be in the hands of those with whom we agree. Ownership of these may easily pass to the worst and most unsocial section of society.

Great inroads upon popular sovereignty have already been made by a venal press in the matter of the Eighteenth Amendment. Here the appeal has been so audacious as to counsel the overthrow and abrogation of law and order in the interests of a noisy and subsidized minority. The appeal is not made to change a law that is bad by regular processes, but to tear to pieces the constitution if necessary to please in some cases the most selfishly unsocial and in other cases the most un-American and criminal elements of society. And this attempt is being made by an organized-bought-and-paid-for system of clack, which would sacrifice the good of the many to the law-

less appetite of the few. One can say all this without in any way defending the principle of prohibition itself which was put into the Constitution by lawful means and can be removed unlawfully only with the destruction of the Republic. Any other suggestion or attempt is an act of treason and would be generally so considered were it not for the extraordinary and puerile obscurantism of much present day political thinking, and the sophistries of the Wets.

We face at the present time in America one of the most remarkable crises that our country has known. For the most part it is not a crisis of our own making. We have been violently jostled out of provincial habits of thought and we have not yet learned to think in terms of universalism. The same may be said of the other nations of the earth. It is provincialism that keeps us from making an end of war, that attempts the perpetuation of old prejudices and hates, that cultivates new hatreds and new fears. Our economic crisis has its roots in the same provincialism. The discoveries of science have brought us into close proximity. Proximity means the sacrifice of individual caprice to the common good. The crowded community is no place for individual caprice and we are now living in a crowded world. The physical, moral and mental welfare of every man is a matter of importance to the whole social order. There is a call for leadership and clear thinking. It is no time to be governed by clack or the paid propaganda of classes and sections of society. In the words of Edith Cavell, "Patriotism is not enough." We can be true to our own only as we are true to the interests of all. Only by such clear and well-thought principles can we end the era of "Bull-roaring" and achieve a new baptism of freedom.

PLATO'S "FORMS" AND PLATO'S "GOD"

PART III

BY R. F. A. HOERNLÉ

(Conclusion)

[Points made by Professor Hoernlé in the preceding installments include the following: The theory of Forms is a theory of knowledge, in which the Form is the principle or essence common to a class of individuals. The Forms are also ideal standards for judging the worth of an individual. They are interrelated in a hierarchy with the Form of the Good as the highest and most universal. But the Good is hardly adequate to the task of accounting for the diverse manifestations of evil. Indeed (to quote the last words from the July issue), "The plain fact of the matter is that in the few passages in the *Dialogues* in which the contrast between Good and Evil in the universe comes up for explicit discussion, Plato takes up an attitude so dualistic, that the interpretation of the Form of Good as the ultimate principle of reality and knowledge becomes quite impossible. For, always Evil stands over against Good in a way which makes its occurrence and its opposition to Good unintelligible in terms of the Good itself."]

The Form of Good and God

This comes out quite clearly when one tries to answer the following two questions:

First, what is the relation of the Form of Evil to the Form of Good?

Second, is the Form of Good identical with God, and, if so, what is the relation of God to the Form of Evil?

As regards the first question, the actual phrase, "Form of Evil," does not occur in Plato's text, not even in the passage from the *Republic* referred to above. But it is implied there, for the passage forms part of Plato's argument distinguishing the singleness of each Form from the multiplicity of its particular embodiments: ". . . and of the just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various

combinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many."⁸

The mention, here, of a Form of Unjust, of course, is additional evidence for the application of the doctrine of Forms to evil qualities. So, again, in a passage in the *Laws*, we find the enumeration, "good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust." And in the *Theaetetus* there is mention of "two patterns set before" men, viz., the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and the punishment of evildoers is said to be that they do not observe how in their evil deeds they practise the evil pattern and grow like unto it in their very souls.⁹

Lastly, the fundamental opposition of Evil and Good is emphasized in all the passages which repeat that God is the author of good only, and that the evil in the world must be ascribed to some cause other than God, except in the cases in which it can reasonably be interpreted as punishment inflicted by him for the sufferer's good. Thus the *Republic* has it:

It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?—Assuredly.—Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, . . . but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.¹⁰

The *Theaetetus* supports this: "The Truth is that God is never in any way unrighteous—he is perfect righteousness."¹¹ Finally, in the *Laws*, Plato, after re-asserting the goodness of God,¹² speaks of the "immortal conflict" between Good and Evil, and says that God "contrived so to place each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole."¹³ But the whole context of the passage makes it clear that God's arrangements merely favour the victory of Good, secure the

⁸See *Republic*, 476a.

⁹See *Theaetetus*, 176e-177a.

¹⁰See *Republic*, 379c.

¹¹*Theaetetus*, 176c.

¹²*Laws*, 901d.

¹³*Laws*, 904b.

possibility of its victory, not that they make that victory inevitable and necessary, still less that the victory consists in an elimination of the very principle of Evil from the universe. No, the thought of Plato, with its emphasis on the immortal conflict of Good and Evil and on the eternal patterns of these two antagonists remains thoroughly dualistic.

Now, as long as it so remains, it is impossible to see how the Form of Good can be the ultimate principle of explanation of the universe. How can it, how does it, account for the presence of Evil either in fact or in principle in the universe? How does it make its own opposite and its conflict with that opposite intelligible? How is its supremacy to be understood when Plato repeatedly affirms that human life exhibits more good than evil? Professor R. C. Lodge interprets the Form of the Good as metaphysical principle by describing it as

the conception of an ideal existence consisting of the fullest and richest development of the potentialities of the universe in a single, self-supporting system, with a complete absence of conflict, waste, privation, and negation.¹⁴

Even granted that the one passage in the *Republic* about the Form of Good might permit such an interpretation as this, it is quite impossible to uphold it in the face of the repeated affirmations of the fundamental opposition of, and conflict between, Good and Evil in the universe.

Turning now to our second question, concerning the relation of the Form of Good to God, it must at once be confessed that there is no unambiguous statement to be found in Plato's text. No wonder, then, that the chief commentators differ widely from one another, each taking the view which seems to him the most probable in the light of his personal philosophical predilections. Raeder, for example, identifies the God of the creation story in the *Timæus* with the Form of Good in the *Republic*: God for him is the Form of Good conceived in its true nature as a creative causal agent, a creative world-soul. Natorp, on the other hand, holds that the personification of the Form of Good as God is a pure metaphor

¹⁴See *Plato's Theory of Ethics*, 141.

appropriate to the "myth" character of the account of creation in the *Timæus*. J. A. Stewart tries to make the best of both worlds by saying that there is identification, but with a difference corresponding to the scientific and religious interpretations of the world, respectively. Both approaches are equally legitimate and necessary, and the identification affirms them not to be mutually exclusive and destructive.

When eminent students of Plato thus disagree, it is clear evidence that Plato's own words give no unambiguous lead. Indeed, in the *Timæus*, he warns us himself not to press his statements too hard:

If then, Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another, do not be surprised.¹⁵

And, truly, it is difficult to fit the various statements of the creation story into a consistent pattern. We are told that God made this world of change and becoming, because

he was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be. . . . God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable.¹⁶

This agrees with another statement a little earlier in the same *Dialogue*: "the world is the fairest of creations and he (God) the best of causes."¹⁷ But there is that tantalising hint concerning some obstacle to the realisation of the highest perfection—"so far as this was attainable." What is the cause or source of this imperfection? Perhaps we are meant to find an explanation in the sentence which follows immediately upon the first of the above quotations:

Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way better than the other.¹⁸

Taken at its face value—and is there any good reason for taking it otherwise?—this can mean only that creation for

¹⁵See *Timæus*, 29c.

¹⁶See *Timæus*, 29e-30a.

¹⁷*Ibidem*, 29a.

¹⁸*Timæus*, 30c.

Plato is not an absolute bringing of the universe into existence *ex nihilo*, but merely an effort to introduce order into a previously existing disorder. And if we connect this in turn with the passages from the *Laws*, quoted above, concerning the "immortal conflict" of Good and Evil, we are back at the severely dualistic position which had been the outcome of our consideration of the relation of the Form of Good and the Form of Evil.

But, prior to all these passages, there occurs in the *Timæus* the famous argument about the two kinds of "patterns" between which God has the choice in creating the universe:

The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect; but when he looks to the created only, and uses a created pattern, it is not fair and perfect.¹⁹

And then the argument goes on to conclude:

If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to that which is eternal. . . . Every one will see that he must have looked to the eternal; for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes.²⁰

This praise of the creation is very difficult to reconcile with all the passages in which Plato appears to estimate that the evil in the world outweighs the good: indeed, I do not know how a reconciliation is intelligibly to be effected. But, leaving this point aside, we have here the passages which have been usually, and plausibly, interpreted by identifying the "eternal patterns" of the *Timæus* with the "eternal Forms" of the *Republic*; and, further, which have been held to imply that the Forms are not identical with God, nor in any sense created by him, but are independently existing patterns which he follows. No other interpretation seems really consistent with Plato's explicit language. Yet, when we bring into the argument the "created patterns" which God might have followed and which are imperfect, the difficulties become well-nigh insuperable. Who has created these patterns? The language of the text does not suggest that it was God who created them; and if he

¹⁹See *Timæus*, 28a.

²⁰*Ibidem*, 29a.

had been their creator, it is unintelligible why he should not have made them perfect.

And, finally, when we recall that there had been mention of a Form of Evil, we get no answer to the question which we can hardly avoid asking, whether this Form is one of the "eternal patterns," and, if it is, whether God ignores it in his creation; or, if he follows it, how creation can be "the fairest" and yet contain within itself an "immortal conflict" of Good and Evil.

The view that God is the creator of the Forms is generally supported by reference to the argument in the Tenth Book of the *Republic*, where God as the maker of the Form of Bed is contrasted with the carpenter who makes physical beds, and with the painter who "imitates" the carpenter's bed and is thus "twice removed from reality." There, God as the "natural author and maker of the bed" (i.e., of the Form of Bed) is further said to be "by the natural process of creation the author of this and of all other things" (scil. of their Forms).²¹ This statement is explicit enough, but how it is to be reconciled with the relation of God to the eternal patterns of the *Theætetus*, or with the existence of a Form of Evil, there is no means of telling.

So, again, the assertion in the *Philebus* that the universe is not left to the guidance of unreason and chance, but is "ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom,"²² conflicts with the existence of Evil in detail and in principle.

One small illustration of the difficulties of eliciting coherent theory from Plato's scattered references to all these inter-related topics may be given in conclusion. In the section of the *Republic* which deals with the Form of Good, there occurs this passage:

You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth though he himself is not generation?—Certainly.—In

²¹*Republic*, 597d.

²²*Philebus*, 28d.

like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.²³

Professor Boodin thinks that the Good which is here said to exceed essence, whilst being the author of essence, cannot be the Form of Good. "When Plato makes the good the creator of essence, he cannot have in mind the idea of good."²⁴ In other words, Professor Boodin seeks to distinguish between the Form of Good as constituting the essence of all particular good things, and the Good as ultimate creative agent. Now, truly, the passage quoted is difficult to interpret. Yet one thing seems clear, viz., that it belongs to a context in which, according to common consent, Plato talks throughout of nothing other than the Form of Good; and there is no trace in his language of any such distinction as Professor Boodin would read into it. The only thing that seems clear is that Plato means to distinguish cause from effect both for the sun and for the Good, and to assign to the cause a more eminent reality. But beyond this it hardly seems safe to go.

Professor Boodin's interpretation of Plato's cosmology has the merit of recognising more fully than do most commentators on Plato the ineradicable dualism in Plato's universe between Good and Evil. He prefers the cosmology of the *Timaeus* to the cosmology of the *Laws*, on the ground that, whilst in the latter the source of Evil is ascribed to evil souls, in the former the failure of the world to realise the full perfection which God strives to impress upon it, "lies in an inherent indifference or laziness on the part of the world in which God works to create order and beauty."²⁵

But even he hardly brings out the full force of the difficulties in which we get unavoidably entangled when we try to think together the main things which Plato says at different times about God, and the Form of Good, and Evil. Let us

²³*Republic*, 509b, c.

²⁴Boodin, "Plato's Cosmology," *Mind*, N.S. No. 152, p. 503. Cf. also No. 153, p. 70.

²⁵*Mind*, N.S., No. 153, p. 77.

sum up the main positions which conflict in this way: (1) So long as there is evil in the world, whether it be due to the laziness of a purely materialistic universe or to the recalcitrance of evil souls, there must, it would seem, be a Form of Evil. (2) This Form of Evil must have a place in the system of Forms through which, according to the *Republic*, the Form of Good realises itself in all that exists; yet how Evil can have such a place is unintelligible. (3) If God is, as the creator of the universe, the embodiment of the Form of Good (if he is the utmost perfection become fact), all other Forms, and therefore the Form of Evil along with the rest, must be an expression of his nature, but this supposition repeats the preceding difficulty, and runs flatly counter to all Plato's own statements about the perfect righteousness of God and his eternal opposition to Evil.

What would we not give for the chance of eliciting from Plato another immortal dialogue giving us his definite solution to our difficulties!

GOD OF OUR DAYS

BY WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

Oh Mighty God!
More surely than of old we trace
In flaming sun and circling world
And in the tiniest atom furled,
 And meanest clod,
Thine awful grandeur and Thy grace.

Yea Living One!
Time is but Thine unwearied might
And Space Thy garment, in whose folds
Thy pow'r all worlds and systems holds —
 Each blazing sun
A gem of which Thou art the light.

Thy love we praise.
The whirling orbs, the lightnings' sheen,
Do not alone reveal Thy pow'r.
Thou givest life. In beast and flow'r,
 God of our days,
And in our souls Thy love is seen.

God of our days,
Accept our praise
For sight made strong to vanquish space,
For skill to track the hurtling spheres
And chart the pathway of the years.
 In deep amaze
And dread we gaze,
Oh God, at last upon Thy face!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONTAIGNE'S SKEPTICISM

BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM

Of that remarkable period in the history of human progress, whose birth is generally associated with Petrarch and the Transalpine humanists who were his followers, it can hardly be disputed that any thinker exhibited its different aspects more clearly and completely than Montaigne. By his sharply defined reaction to the world and its affairs, his own peculiar nature found full enjoyment in the expression of all the strange characteristics of that decided individuality which was developed by the political and religious struggles of sixteenth-century France, and of which he was essentially a product. It was because of this ideal agreement of the man with his age that Montaigne was far better able than his contemporaries to indicate, as well as to reveal, the features of that humanism which France considered as her own, and which has been since regarded, in its true essence, as skepticism. The philosophy of this skepticism is essentially an explanation of Montaigne's individualism, as well as a reflection of the spirit and temper of his age.

The characteristic quality of Montaigne's individualism was his inherent tendency to dissociate himself from his fellow-men and find in solitude the necessary requirements for the expression of his own peculiar personality, which he wished to preserve unchanged. His observations of the continual changing of factions and opinions, which he realized was only leading to darkness and confusion, may have exerted some influence upon his decision; it no doubt precipitated retirement to his chateau where among his books he gave himself up to meditation and reflection. Montaigne was profoundly affected by the purpose and significance of creation, and this susceptibility to the perpetual question had bred in him a deep desire to fathom that mysterious unknown into which every man must pass. The road to this object lay, not in a study of worldly affairs, which those of his time led only to further

perplexity and confusion, but in a study of himself. "I study myself more than any other subject," he says; "it is my supernatural Metaphysics, it is my Natural Philosophy." By preserving his identity, and studying his personality, he thought he could discover the faint light of the ultimate truth; an impossibility because the limitations of man's powers are defined by the knowledge of man's creation. But in spite of this unconscious realization, this occupation with the ego, in which a man gives himself up to his own thoughts and is wrapped up in his own moods, is rich in wisdom because it denotes that the individual is freed from traditionary assumptions and, regardless of an authority, can resign himself quietly to the currents of his own nature and let himself be guided by them.

Montaigne employed the comparative method within the intellectual sphere still more extensively than Machiavelli; and not merely, as has often been believed, in order to draw skeptical allusions from the multifariousness of the characters, views and tendencies which he brought to light. Interested primarily in individual nuances, he felt at the same time the joy of the Humanist over the richness of his material. What especially fascinated him was the vision of the immeasurable world of intellectual phenomena, not merely the inner differences or conflicts which may exist within it.

It was inevitable that Montaigne's individualism, no less than his humanism, should have rendered him antagonistic to every attempt to enforce dogmatically any one general doctrine. Attacking theological, as well as philosophic dogmatism, he once remarked to the orthodox that if we were really in earnest with our faith in the supernatural,—“if this ray of Divinity did in any sort touch us,”—our lives would appear quite different. Life would then be transformed in all its relations in obedience to the divine commands, and religious wars, with their ignoble passions, could not inspire enmity in us one with another. We are guided more by custom and tradition than by divine powers; God's cause alone would fail to raise even a single company. Was not the religious turmoil

of his time inspired by greed for mundane benefits and the satisfaction of passions? Did not the Papacy's greed for temporal power lead to conflict between the Church and the State and the ultimate questioning of the Catholic significance? And to Montaigne, the means employed by the Papacy to attain its ends did anything but justify faith in that institution which professed to be the instrument of God.

But even in the absence of modifying influences, it is evident that our faculty of framing ideas is unable to conceive of anything beyond the limitations of our own nature. We can think our own qualities either augmented or diminished, but we cannot transcend them. And as every being's chief interest is in himself—in his own peculiar nature, we conceive the Deity in the form of man and believe that everything in the world is done for the benefit of men. But would not animals reason similarly? He who believes he knows anything of God inevitably traduces His significance. Of the many human conceptions of religion the most probable is the one which recognizes God to be an incomprehensible power, the author and preserver of all things, who is only goodness and perfection, and who graciously accepts the homage which men pay Him, whatever be the form under which they conceive Him, and in whatever way they attest their veneration.

Montaigne's refutation of orthodox assertions allows little room for the expression of human reason. To him, man's knowledge is evil, for the senses which lead to his knowledge are uncertain and erring, so one can never be sure that they teach us the truth. They only show us the world as modified by their nature and condition. Merely the condition of the sense-organs appears to us in sensuous perception, not external objects (*les sens ne comprennent pas le subject estranger, ains seulement leurs propres passions*). To place reliance and implicit confidence in the senses we must possess some means by which to control them, and again, some means of controlling this means, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Reason, as well, leads us to no final decision; every reason adduced in support of an

argument itself, in turn, requires a reason, and so on again, *ad infinitum*. And furthermore, as we consider, we find ourselves, as well as our objects, continually changing and shifting; there is nothing fixed and invariable. To attempt to establish general laws or types is absurd and hopeless for the wealth of differences is so great that no law can exhaust the manifoldness of cases. And the more penetrating our examination, the more differences are discovered, so that in any attempt to bring all these discovered differences and variations under common points of views we should find that they stand in inner contradiction to one another. A comparison, then, can lead to no result. In like manner, continual modifications and wide differences are to be found as well within the sphere of moral and civil laws. There is no natural law which is observed by all men; moral laws change in conformation to time and place. What goodness is that which was goodness yesterday but which tomorrow will be evil? Is Truth an indeterminate quality which viewed from a different angle becomes a lie? Doubt under such circumstances is our last resort. But even doubt cannot be regarded as definitely valid. We dare not say we know nothing. Our result is then: *que sais-je?*

Pascal accepted this line of thought as Montaigne's last word and for that reason it has often been regarded as skepticism. But it fails to touch the fundamental principle of Montaigne's conception of life, the point about which for him all things finally turn, and which was later to enable him to indicate a complete conception of the world. Montaigne was too much of a conversationalist to develop his world-conception in a purely philosophic form. His last word is not the bewildering difference of phenomena—not skepticism—but rather the idea of Nature in her grandeur and infinity who serves as a background for all things, whose power and beauty find expression and reflection in a peculiar manner in every individual creature and thing.

In Montaigne's concept of Nature, his refutation of knowledge even extended to the praising of ignorance for the latter

gives Nature freedom in the expression of her qualities and does not hinder, by reflection and art, "our great and powerful mother Nature from guiding us." He understood, of course, not ignorance as uncultured and thoughtless vacuity but the ignorance arising from an understanding of the limitations of our knowledge. To Montaigne, his concept of Nature had a wide significance; in small matters as well as large she was the ultimate authority. We must submit to the order of Nature and allow her to do as she pleases for she understands matters better than we; interference in any of her desires or aims is futile. In any matter, be it of illness or education, the great thing is to allow Nature to have free course. Like the harmony of the world, our life consists of opposites, of different tones which all belong to the great whole; and which are continually interchanging by the express wishes of the power that controls them. To allow them freedom is to derive the utmost in benefit from them, but to interfere with them and subject them to our own desires is to attack the harmony of the whole with only disastrous results. The only way, he says, in which man can guard himself from measuring things with a false measure is by keeping before him "our mother Nature in all her majesty": she shows us a general and continual variety in which we discover ourselves and all that we call great to be but a vanishing point. This will hinder us from setting arbitrary and narrow limits and so give rise to tolerance. In this concept, we find virtually a recantation of his skepticism. And on his final result with regard to religion, where he expresses himself as believing that the Deity is worshipped by different nations under as many different forms, he founds his conservatism by saying:

I have little patience with what is new under whatever form it may occur. Not because existing laws are always reasonable. The validity of laws rests not on their righteousness, but on the fact that they are laws; *c'est le fondement mystique de leur auctorité*. Custom is the mistress of the world. Conscience feels bound to that which it has been accustomed to respect, and cannot part from it without pain. The wise man must, indeed, free his soul within, but in external matters he must observe

existing laws and customs. To undertake to replace them by anything better is foolish presumption.

This conservatism, being a part of his faith in Nature, seems to imply that Nature reveals herself through that which has become use and wont, and so then, according to his own view, the new must be every bit as "natural" as the old.

It is quite apparent that Montaigne's concept of Nature is primarily founded on his most prominent characteristic—his individualism. Should every man pay attention and listen to the events taking place within himself (*s'il s'écoute*) he would discover a nature and way peculiar to himself, a ruling character (*forme ainne, forme maitresse, forme universelle*) which would offer resistance to external influences and keep him from incompatible emotions. And this character is in its innermost essence unchangeable. Although I may wish another "form," even detesting and condemning that which I do possess, that which is rooted deepest in my nature cannot be repented of, for repentance concerns only that which can be changed. And so by the use of this "ruling form" Nature finds speech within each one of us,—to each, of course, in a different way, so that every man must be judged by his own particular norm. By this view, Montaigne preserves the rights both of the nature of the particular individual and that of the great whole.

Referring to the absolute regeneration demanded by the Church, Montaigne maintained that such a complete transformation is impossible. The reality of repentance, if it involve such a transformation, has no foundation, for repentance is only possible by the violation of an inner principle through the perpetration of an evil deed. It is true that reason alleviates all other care and sorrow, yet she begets the pain of repentance; and this pain is the severest of all, because it arises within us. In a similar manner, we feel inner satisfaction and a noble pride when we do good and possess a good conscience. Everyone, thought Montaigne, must possess an inner touchstone (*un patron au dedans*) by which to

judge his actions. "Only thou thyself canst judge thy actions. Others see not so much thy nature as thine art." In other words, we cannot conclude from externals to the inner man.

By what means this *patron au dedans* arises, and in what relation it is attached to the *forme maitresse*, Montaigne failed to explain more clearly. Though he praised ignorance and a quiet surrender to Nature, it is hardly conceivable to suppose that he meant we should leave everything in the practical sphere to Nature. The individual nature develops into its own peculiar form only under the co-operation of the deliberation and the will; and only through labor and attention can the "ruling form" be preserved from disfigurement. Montaigne was aware, however, that he had no heroic will; and that if he had virtue it was attributable rather to good fortune than to the work of the will. In other words, had he possessed a less fortunate nature he could not answer how it might have gone with him; possessing a natural detestation for most vices, yet he might just as well have succumbed to their temptation had he been less fortunate in his governing nature. To him, inner strife and discord were unendurable. Reason strove continually for mastery within him, many times having been severely taxed to avoid being disfigured by the impulses which she was not always able to reform. And yet it was his firm conviction that the highest pleasure is attached to virtue, while struggle can only be a state of transition. The lower pleasures are only momentary and fleeting and are oftentimes apt to be followed by remorse and sorrow. Perfect satisfaction, equally far removed from sensuous pleasures and from painful struggle to keep the commandments of reason, can only be found where the innermost nature of the soul finds expression in good actions. The development of an inner nature such that every occasion to inward struggle vanishes was regarded by Montaigne as the highest achievement. Recognizing his own weakness, he appreciated the strength of others and admired "the greatness of heroic souls." And in an age when virtue was regarded as little else than a *jargon du*

collège, he considered it no trifle that he had retained the power to pronounce ethical judgments.

In his concept of Nature, Montaigne went beyond the limited form in which it had appeared among the Greek thinkers. By associating it with the concept of individuality it is extended to infinity. If Montaigne opposed Nature to the artificialities of men, it was because the latter regarded certain particular "forms" as alone justified and thus overlooked the fullness of Nature; and also because they did violence to certain particular individualities which possess the same right to develop themselves *sur son propre modèle* as any others. It was for the future to unfold these two thoughts of infinity and individuality. Montaigne's skepticism—which was really an assertion of the right to think—induced him to transcend artificial barriers; while his rich experience and vast humanistic learning gave him a freedom of mind and the means, not only to emphasize the importance of these two concepts, but also to see beyond their limits to new individual forms, by means of which one and the same single infinite nature finds expression.

GUYAU'S "MORALITY WITHOUT OBLIGATION OR SANCTION" : AN APPRECIATION

BY WILLIAM F. RICE

The French poet and philosopher, Jean Marie Guyau (1854-88), was characterized by early maturity, clearness of thought, sincerity of purpose, fearlessness of statement, and an æsthetic turn of mind, finding expression in philosophical and art studies, but also in his *Vers d'un philosophe*.

Temperamentally eminently suited to the discussion of æsthetics, the consideration of morality is found throughout his career from his youthful study, *La Morale d'Epicure*, for which he was "crowned" by the Academy in 1874, to his masterpiece, the *Esquisse d'une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction*, published in 1885.

In order to orient our study we must bear in mind that in his day the physical sciences were being emphasized, reaction from Eclecticism and Positivism had set strongly toward a new spiritual philosophy in which Fouillée, whose intellectual parenthood is manifest in the thought of Guyau, and Guyau himself were important factors. In England, with whose thought he showed his familiarity in *Morale anglaise contemporaine*, Bentham, Mill, Darwin and Spencer contributed stimulating influences. Familiarity with the great work of Kant, frequently cited by Guyau, and his contemporary Nietzsche, with whose philosophy he had enough in common to lead Höfding to select these two as the representatives of the philosophy of value, prepared him to discuss his problems in the light of the best thought of his day.

Guyau sets out to find an explanation of morality involving none but rational support, hence the necessity to forego much claimed by those who sought to be strictly scientific, *i.e.*, the utilitarian, evolutionist and positivist, since they seemed bound to follow and account for theories of morality based on metaphysical speculation.

As science has set aside dogmatic notions of religion, Guyau

holds that the same must be done in an examination of morality; *i.e.*, a scientific conception of morality must be based only on what is actually *known*, even though the result be far from the usual conception of morality.

Having set such narrow limits, the author may frankly admit that the findings are comparatively meagre. Such morality as is involved in metaphysical speculation can not be called strictly scientific, and however interesting, should be sharply delimited from what we claim as having a truly scientific foundation.

The contemporary theories of Spencer, von Hartmann and Fouillée reveal the fact that Naturalism and Positivism, like Idealism, fail to establish fixed principles of obligation or sanction for morality based upon verifiable facts, but at best only offer hypotheses.

Noting this absence of a determining standard, Guyau undertakes to find admissible equivalents or substitutes for the idea of Duty. The notion which he opposes is that of a *categorical imperative* whose obligation and sanction lie wholly outside of the autonomous activity of the subject and are imposed upon the ego from without.

We are perhaps anticipating, as a result of this study, the arrival at something very like an obligation or sanction, though we may find it not in an external imposed standard, but in an internal, ego-centric impulse. A recognition of the difference between these theories may imply a less clearly defined and universal standard equally applicable to all persons and circumstances, since our impulses will vary to a greater or less extent with the dissimilarity of individuals.

Guyau, trying to find facts of experience upon which to rest substitutes for externally imposed duty, criticises metaphysical attempts to justify the idea of obligation. He rejects the hypothesis of optimism as logically a negation of progress leading to stagnation; *i.e.*, if all is good we should let it alone, but in any system of morality there is a presupposition of free will—of a power to choose, without which there could be

neither merit nor demerit. But the hypothesis of pessimism is even less tenable. Assuming that the totality of suffering is greater than that of pleasure points to a moral philosophy like the common conception of *Nirvana*—to von Hartmann's voluntary race suicide. In estimating suffering and pleasure we must weigh both quantitative and qualitative aspects of experience. We may also observe that suffering has corrective effects. It is an appeal to the will to assert itself in acts which produce amelioration and restoration; hence the error of pessimism, holding that suffering is negative and valueless. If there is free will, and if there is in it power to respond with measures effective toward restoration, the worst conceivable condition may contain possibilities and even tendencies toward self-restoration.

Rejecting the hypotheses of optimism and pessimism, Guyau turns to a third: the hypothesis of the indifference of nature. To the man of science nature is absolutely "neutral, as unconscious of suffering as of pleasure, of good as of evil." Since we do not know what nature is, Kant was right in saying that we must not ask metaphysics to give us any sure law of conduct.

Turning to the usually accepted standards, Guyau says the morality of *practical certitude* cannot be maintained because it is relative and uncertain. The *feeling* of obligation is not moral but sensible, and as Kant indicated it is like any other sentiment a pathological condition, and as such, is subject to fluctuation and cannot be a standard of universal application. What then shall be said of the *morality of faith*? This is of such a nature that it cannot be a subject of scientific consideration. It is simply a dogmatic assertion though it invokes the internal evidence of conscience or the external motive of social necessity, since neither can be given a scientifically adequate foundation to make it serve as a universal law of conduct. In rejecting the claims of the morality of faith Guyau says:

In the domain of thought there is nothing more moral than truth; and when truth cannot be secured through positive

knowledge nothing is more moral than doubt.

This he deems to be best, namely the *morality of doubt*, because this attitude of mind is at least one of absolute sincerity with itself and others. It founds morality

partly on the very consciousness of our metaphysical ignorance joined to what we have learned from positive science.

Herein Guyau follows Fouillée who makes the fact of consciousness his experimental starting point to unite in a synthesis the philosophies of evolution and of criticism. This fact is the foundation stone of a standard of right and justice. Self-consciousness and consciousness of others implies the idea of relations, and out of a consideration of possible relations there may come, says Fouillée,

an ideal more or less determinable for me—a future which I am more or less able to realize.

This again

presupposes the belief in a possible influence of the will on it, and on its realization in the future.

Guyau makes a résumé so vital to his argument that it must be quoted:

It is important . . . to make room in morality for our positive ignorance, our positive doubt, and, so to speak, for the certainty of our incertitude. This M. Fouillée has done . . . He has logically reduced the idea of the imperative to its true value. Kant, we have said, saw in it a certainty; his followers raised it to an object of faith; now it is reduced to a formula of our doubt, to a limitation of our conduct by a limitation of our thought. After having been an *imperative* order, the unknowable is nothing but an *interrogation*. This interrogation presents itself to each one of us; but the answer which each one of us can give to it varies with individuals, and is left to their own initiative.

Moral philosophy based on facts finds its point of departure in the fundamental fact of life itself—life in the widest sense of the word. It cannot begin with the idea of the good or happiness of society, which would in itself constitute a sort of external obligation for morality. Before society comes the individual. Individual life must first find a justification for its own existence and perpetuation. Once this motive is established it may extend its interests and find place for more inclu-

sive motive, in a sense outside itself, though always centering in and almost identified with itself.

Scientifically morality finds its first expression in a need of growth, self-preservation, reproduction—in the life impulse:

The pursuit of pleasure is only the consequence of the instinctive effort to maintain and enlarge life. The aim which in fact determines every conscious action is also the cause which produces every unconscious action. It is then life itself—life in its most intense, and at the same time, its most varied forms.

In the dawning of consciousness it is seen in the act of nutrition. An inner urge prompts the effort to perpetuate the spark of existence. This results both in satisfaction and in storing of surplus energy that in turn is devoted to reproduction. Now the original ego-centric life impulse is extended to include other life, in part a separate existence but in part identified with itself. This expanding tendency makes the family, and finally the larger grouping of society with its relations.

Two aspects are seen: the first centripetal—nutrition, assimilation, with a resulting surplus. This turns outward, is centrifugal in aspect—reproduction with all the other altruistic tendencies. Any moral quality or motive in this double tendency is scientifically an expression of varying forms of the original life impulse. If close analysis shows this to be fundamentally selfish, the significance of this depends upon definition of the term. If the expanding tendency of life results in unification of all, then selfishness means the good of all. Extreme altruism cannot logically argue for utter self-neglect, the consequence of which would be only von Hartmann's voluntary race suicide.

Guyau shows how, as surplus energy results in reproduction, similarly it causes intellectual fecundity, fecundity of emotion, sensibility and will, so that with increasing centrifugal activity we have the expenditure of life for others in social relations, which taking all into account is not a loss for the individual, but a desirable enlargement, and even a necessity of life:

Whence it follows that the most perfect organism will be also the most sociable, and that the ideal of individual life is the life in common.

Guyau asks:

To what extent does inward power create a sort of obligation? He replies that "I can" implies "I must." "The theory of the categorical imperative is therefore psychologically exact and deep, as the expression of a fact of consciousness; only Kant had no right, without proof, to consider this imperative as transcendental. 'A practical internal necessity' can be a more or less instinctive and even mechanical necessity. In morality, as in genius, there can exist a kind of natural power, preceding knowledge—a power which impels us to act and to produce."

Again he says:

Duty imposing itself on consciousness as a superior force once being admitted with Kant, let us try to clearly show this fact in its essential variations, and in its relations with the other facts of consciousness. We will afterwards see if to us it seems to offer anything supernatural.

Viewed from the standpoint of will, intelligence, and sensibility, Guyau finds equivalents of duty, first, in the existence of a certain impersonal urge created by the power-of-acting itself. Duty is a superabundance of life demanding to exercise, to impart itself. Instead of being a necessity, a compulsion, it is a power—an inner principle demanding expression. Surplus energy seeking expression can compass its aim with certainty only when we have power to go beyond it, which results in the law of nature that "life can maintain itself only on the condition of diffusing itself."

The second equivalent of duty is found in the conception-of-action. As the power-to-act created a natural obligation or impulse, so intelligence is itself a motive-power. Here we meet Fouillée's theory of ideas as forces (*les idées forces*) reminding us also of the pregnant Platonic doctrine of ideas. Guyau declares:

Conception of aim, effort to attain—these are not two things... Thought, action—are fundamentally identical. Obligation is an internal expansion—a need to complete our ideas by converting them into action. The distinction between will and intelligence has been made too great... It may be said that will is but a superior degree of intelligence, and that action is but a superior degree of will.

Hence it follows that morality is simply the harmonious and complete unity of our being—a consistent completion of each life impulse.

A third equivalent of duty, derived from the nature of sensibility is described as the "growing fusion of the sensibilities and the more sociable character of the higher pleasures." Superior pleasures tend less to separate individuals than those requiring greater outlay of material or energy. Thus mankind becomes more sociable until ultimately man can only realize his most perfect life in the widest possible relations. In other words, the perfection of the developed individual will consist in the perfect development and interaction of society. Still, whatever moral standard we have finds its basis in the individual. Vice and virtue as we conceive them are expressions of will; therefore real progress can only spring from the inner nature of the individual. The sanctions of reward and punishment are only justifiable as a social defence, and possess no salutary value for the individual unless transformed in the crucible of consciousness into an outward-looking rather than an externally imposed sanction.

Attempting to show how far deliberate consciousness feels bound by that inward pressure on which he bases all sense of obligation which a strictly scientific conception of morality has, Guyau says that scientific morality can give to the individual this commandment only:

Develop your life in all directions: be an "individual" as rich as possible in intensive and extensive energy; therefore be the most social and sociable being.

A review of Guyau's work shows that he opposes the theory that morality is based on externally imposed obligation. An examination of available evidence, showing lack of uniformity in human conceptions of duty, and the impotence of sanctions to produce conformity to law seem to justify Guyau's claim that the real seat and source of obligation and sanction is within the individual so far as it has verifiable reality.

We are inclined to hold that his thesis would have been

more correctly stated as Morality without *external* obligation or sanction, since he seems to have found that an internal obligation does exist. He might reply that no real obligation exists, since we do not know that what we conceive as right action has an absolute value different from or superior to what we call wrong action, and that what he calls "the indifference of nature" gives no clue to any value whatever. Here we take issue with him on a fundamental ground. Beings with free will are capable of choosing good or evil and such choice contains within itself both cause and effect, but Guyau seems to have missed a very vital consideration, namely that the life impulse which he has so clearly and intelligently portrayed can only be conceived as endowed with definite and positive tendencies.

We deal with what we consider spontaneous vital activities, but we find on what Guyau would doubtless accept as legitimate scientific observation, that inner impulses must on the whole lead toward and result in such actions as are constructive, beneficial, pleasurable; since every action in the opposite direction proves to be destructive, and by a process of atrophy or natural selection is destined to diminish and finally to disappear. Then the urge of life is inevitably by its very nature toward universal good. What is this universal good? It can only be conceived as whatever contributes toward life—toward the greatest progress in the only thing we know, namely life. How do we know what constitutes progress? Observation of the processes of evolution gives us a scientific standard, as it reveals to us the ever increasing capacity of life.

Guyau's conclusion that the life impulse is following its normal course as it leads to more and more socialized activities, while ever retaining its individualized center, seems but to point to a profound truth, namely that the twofold tendency indicated as the centripetal and centrifugal activities are but the alternating pulsations of an existence which is both individual and social. The individual having his separate existence in some sense is also and in a real and vital sense identified

with a great unity which enfolds all being. The tendencies which manifest themselves in the separate life impulse are the same tendencies which originate in and lead back to the greater unity. Thus, the obligation and sanction finding expression in the inner impulse of the individual, permeate the whole, point toward the common good, guarantee ultimate progress.

LET ME GROW OLD

BY FRANCIS MASON

Let me grow old
Without the pain
Of struggle to
Rise young again,

Without the striving
Still to know
Why time is swift
And waiting slow.

Let me grow wise
With wondering
At every
Undiscovered thing.

As calm as any
Cliff may be
That looks upon
A depthless sea.

CURRENT THOUGHT

Recent Discussions of Professor Whitehead

Professor Whitehead's philosophy is certainly one of the significant "events" of its kind in recent years, and it is a relief to find, at last, a systematic, scholarly exposition of his system. This is Jean Wahl's monograph, "La philosophie speculative de Whitehead," which appeared in two installments in the *Revue Philosophique* for May-June and July-August of 1931. M. Wahl, working from all of Whitehead's books, gives the latter's metaphysical, non-epistemological attitude springing out of his belief in the "intentionality" of thought, and expounds his criticism of scientific materialism. Then he considers the following subjects as treated by Whitehead: Space and time, Events, Causal Efficacy, Organism, Objects, Eternal Energy and Value, and finally, God.

It is evident that a work of this sort, carefully done, should have great value; and in this case it is most carefully done. The various exciting and influential terms introduced by the famous mathematician-philosopher are exhibited in a simple and clear light. The exposition, written primarily for French readers, may well be useful to students everywhere. To be sure, it is objective rather than critical, but this constitutes its strength. Few men can be considered better authorities on English philosophy than M. Wahl, and his rendering of Whitehead into lucid French is a distinct service to contemporary thought.

Another important and related work is Professor Lloyd Morgan's article, "Professor Whitehead's Philosophy," in *Philosophy* for July, 1931. It is primarily the effort of a psychologist and metaphysician to recognize the limits of both these types of thought and to point out how certain errors have come from too free a commingling of them. Proceeding deliberately and clearly, Professor Morgan indicates just why he cannot wholly follow his distinguished contemporary in the latter's "philosophy of organism." In general, his is the common objection (and one very natural to "emergent evolution") that one should not attribute anthropomorphic categories to the whole range of being. The metaphysical task is important and cannot be adequately accomplished, Morgan holds, with such psychological tools as purpose, perceptive apprehension and the like.

The author's ABC of his philosophy affords him the point of departure. A stands for Agency or Activity, B for physical events in their Behavior, and C stands for Conscious, or mental events. A complete system should synthesize all three, but not, thinks Morgan, through the "C" categories, which are admittedly late and time-infected emergents. The course of evolution may reveal novelties that dwarf, for example, our teleological analogies, and reveal Agency as something far greater than mind. Philosophy, apparently, must wait several hours, in that ante-room where a thousand years is a day.

CARL FARMAN.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

Dodona Revisited

And so we came again to Dodona, fulfilling the ancient prophecy—he on foot and I on the back of “Bay Beauty.” The loved San Gabriel when last I heard it was boisterous with the springs of early summer and sent forth its voice from bend, fall and cataract with challenging roar. Now the heats of summer have done their worst in a long succession of dry summers. The cataracts have shrunk to dribbles and here and there the dry bed of the stream indicates that the river itself survives only by retreating beneath the gray shingles and sands that fill the canyon gulch. The heat is intense and the gray lizards so sluggish that they refuse to move until I poke their noses with the little willow switch that is my riding crop. One by one the leaves are falling, since there is not moisture now to support so many—nature’s manner of thrift in the face of depression. The cessation of activity gives the impression of Autumn, though the August sun is still shining and the cascara cherries are only beginning to ripen. The tiger lily holds up its few ripened vesicles in the hope and promise of its yearly resurrection, but its whorl of leaves is still green and glaucous. The blue and the scarlet larkspurs that once gave forth their gorgeous colors are but a brownish tracery upon the hillside. Everywhere nature has had her fruition and is resting from her labors. My stream, however, while no longer boisterous, is still jocund and I hear again and again its crooning song of hope. It does not impress one outwardly as did the roaring surge of waters rushing to the sea, but its song is sweeter to the ear, and to the thirsty wild things who come to drink it is more necessary than ever. I startle a doe with her faun feeding on the greenery of the river bed and they gaze after the manner of deer, as if determined not to run unless menaced. I take my rod to hunt the old pools that have not felt my touch for years, and through the evening shadows I stir the wary trout to action for they cannot even be approached now while the sunlight lies upon the water. A city boy comes smashing by me in eagerness to preempt the pools ahead, marches boldly to the edge and casts, while every trout therein finds safe retreat under log or rock. He goes back to camp malingering the fishing, while upon my face I creep from pool to pool. But this is the lesson of the stream and of age, for the battle is not always to the strongest and more boisterous.

A sagging creel is not, however, the highest gift of my Dodona. The sun, long set within the canyon, still throws a flood of heavenly light upon a distant cloud-embroidered peak on which I gaze from out the darkness. But now to the great pool! I cast until the darkness falls and the rising moon mounts the rock wall. The tang of wood-smoke floating far down the ravine tells me that my companions have prepared their evening meal, but in the murmur of the

stream, the sunset and the moonrise, the memories that come drifting down like wood-smoke along every bend in the trail, there is "meat to eat that they wit not of." For Dodona has been communing with me. In her speaking leaves I have heard again the voice of the oracle. A new peace lingers in my heart from the midst of the Autumnal heats of life. I lean reverently and drink again from her waters, for "he who drinks must surely return to her." R. T. F.

La Turbie

Most travellers who take the "High Corniche" drive have been impressed with the ancient tower of La Turbie on the heights above Monaco. It was voted by the Roman Senate to one of the Cæsars as a grateful memorial of the final triumph of civilization over the barbarians. One can visualize the Gargantuan laughter of Attila and his hordes as they swept by it to the sack of Rome. It is a standing monument to the uselessness of monuments.

We can announce the final triumph of nothing in this world. Civilization never is but is always in process of achievement. Neither is it ever safe so long as there remains any portion of mankind who are not committed to it. Our finest victories are never final but must be won over and over. No sooner does civilization prepare her bivouac than the bugles begin blowing *réveille*. Are there then no permanent gains of history? Yes and no! Yes! if one generation is able in some measure to profit by its contacts with the past. No! if we hope to find a progress existing apart from the achievements, attitudes, ideals and aspirations of the individuals who comprise society. The great gifts of history may be less in the achievement of mass movements than in the provision it makes for the moral training of individuals. For that reason the battle must be refought in every generation and won or lost in every individual life. There seems no doubt concerning these certain facts. But if they be facts their surest implication is the necessity of individual and personal immortality. God, or the Cosmos, or Nature, would not maintain a training school whose brief end was to be oblivion. R. T. F.

Along the Bookshelf

History of Thought

HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY: The Sophists, Socrates, Plato, by B. A. G. FULLER. Henry Holt and Co., N. Y. 1931. Pp. x, 493. \$3.00.

HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY: Aristotle, by B. A. G. FULLER. Henry Holt and Co., N. Y. 1931. Pp. ix, 372. \$2.75.

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF DAVID HUME'S PHILOSOPHY: An Essay towards a Phenomenological Interpretation of the First Book of the Treatise of Human Nature, by C. V. SALMON. Max Niemeyer, Halle. 1929. Pp. vii, 151.

These two goodly volumes are the second and third of Professor Fuller's *History of Greek Philosophy*, of which the first, *Thales to Democritus*, appeared in 1923. Professor Fuller modestly disclaims "any original ideas or research," declaring that he writes "out of the general histories and the more specialized discussions already available, even to the point of plagiarism;" but he is determined to disturb "the vulgar superstition that philosophy is intrinsically a dull subject," and is animated by a faith that "the history of philosophy constitutes one of the best detective stories ever written," and seeks to impart to the American undergraduate his conviction that "philosophy is exciting and its history romantic." Accordingly he eschews solemnity and pedantry of style, and enlivens his expositions by abundant homely and topical illustrations, and not a little slang. He will thereby shock not a few old-fashioned scholars, who stand upon the dignity of their subject rather than upon their own merits, but I have little doubt that he is right in principle. If the history of philosophy in general, and of Greek philosophy in particular, cannot be rendered intelligible and interesting to undergraduates, the attempt to teach it had much better be given up. For if it can only be represented as an endless and fruitless wrangle about obscure and unmeaning technicalities devoid of all interest and importance, emphasis on the history of philosophy can only be deadly hurt to the cause of philosophy. It would then be far better for philosophers to descend again into the market-place, after the fashion of Socrates, in order to discover afresh what were the philosophic problems weighing upon the life of the man in the street. At any rate it seems to me that Professor Fuller on his chosen lines has achieved a very considerable measure of success. His books are skilfully compiled and readable, and deserve to be read. I regret only that he has been so reticent about his own opinions and so sparing of delivering judgment on the many controversial issues with which he has to deal. I regret this not merely because one would like to have Professor Fuller's judgment on the controversies he has studied so earnestly but also because it would be so much more instructive and

stimulating to emphasize the clashes and contrasts between our thought and that of the Greeks than to insinuate that the Greeks were invariably talking perfectly good sense, and that their doctrines had never been antiquated. The educational value of Greek thought surely depends largely on the gorgeous paradoxes, with which it challenges modern complacency, and the naive, unconscious intellectualism which contrasts so vividly with our quaint respect for well-meaning action, however stupid. That virtue is just knowledge, that vice is involuntary and merely ignorance deserving not of punishment, but of instruction, and that conscious wrong-doing is unthinkable, are paradoxes it needs an agile ethics to confute. Professor Fuller would have done better to follow Plato, who did not shrink from pointing out that if virtue is knowledge the analogy of the arts requires us to admit that the just man is a kind of thief, than the sermonizing tradition that he acts on so frequently with the maxim "it is not incumbent on us to rush in where others tread gingerly. We have only to outline the two views, and leave the question open" (*Plato*, p. 69). Similarly he leaves it an unsolved problem on p. 421 "what Plato really meant by God." No doubt he does not always act upon this maxim: thus, he decides, a little rashly, that Plato could not have believed in personal immortality (p. 332), and this without even mentioning the chief objection to this belief, pointed out long ago by Teichmüller, viz., the difficulty of admitting a plurality of souls into a metaphysic which recognizes only a single "idea" of every reality; and on page 379 he takes the Forms as formulae for reducing "all qualitative to quantitative difference" in a way which is not easy to reconcile with the remark on p. 386 that the Number Forms "are themselves not quantitative but qualitative." But these are minor matters and Professor Fuller's books may be recommended as probably the most convenient modern accounts of Plato and Aristotle in English. It remains only to add that both books are singularly free from misprints.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

The interpretation of *The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy*, by C. V. Salmon, is an offprint from the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, and an attempt to capture Hume for a school "whose attitude towards philosophy and philosophical problems is akin to Hume's." Mr. Salmon declares that

the Phenomenological conception of Consciousness as the matter of philosophy, as the foundation of all intelligence whatever, and the a priori alike to Logic and Psychology, resembles Hume's conception of Human Nature. Historians will see Hume's lineal successors, not in Kant or Mill, but in Brentano and Husserl (p. 3).

German historians of philosophy are capable of much, but it may be doubted whether Mr. Salmon will be found to have sufficiently en-

lightened their insight. For, after his long and labored expositions and criticisms of Hume, he neglects to explain how Phenomenology would dispose of Hume's problems (or, indeed, of any others). I have not, consequently, found him at all convincing. F. C. S. S.

Birds of Passage

THE FLIGHT FROM REASON, by ARNOLD LUNN. Lincoln MacVeagh, the Dial Press, New York. 1931. Pp. 328. \$3.50.

FLIGHTS FROM CHAOS, by HARLOW SHAPLEY. McGraw-Hill and Company, Inc., New York. 1930. Pp. 168. \$2.50.

We would put Mr. Lunn's book into the hands of every college student if for no other reason than to weaken the hold upon their minds of that unthinking and immodest scientific dogmatism which keeps so much of the present world in its rigorous grasp. The author has put in trenchant phrase, and directly, this overbearing dogmatism which he calls the Victorian Heresy. For the most part it is devastating and unanswerable. It is good in our own day to watch the revolt against the scientific credulity before which all have bowed the knee and in the presence of which religion has been too often apologetic. Here is the sign of a better day both for science and religion. The dogmatism of science has consisted not in conclusions forced by discovery of scientific facts but in philosophic hypotheses which ran far ahead of the facts and were insisted upon as scientific. We have thought according to the remark quoted by the author from Eddington "that the way to understand or explain a scientific phenomenon was to make a correct mechanical model of it."

This day is now over with the great leading scientists of the day, but the mechanists and materialists will continue for a long time to claim ascendancy. It is good however that we have turned the corner into a new day which promises vast enrichment in scientific discovery and a new understanding of the need and inevitability of religion.

We honestly wish Mr. Lunn had been content with exhibiting his main thesis, without the attempt to justify modern spiritism which he disclaims or to prove the perfection of the rationalism of Thomas Aquinas. These should have been treated in separate volumes and the present one would have been stronger.

As if to provide the exact illustration of that scientific dogmatism against which Mr. Lunn complains, the reviewer had placed in his hands at the same time, Professor Shapley's *Flights from Chaos*. For one who appreciates unconscious humor the first five chapters devoted to scientific dogmatisms will provide racy reading, although that is far from the intent of the author. The chapter on Corpuscles is perhaps the most delectable. An attempt is made to grasp reality, as —5, which represents the unknown —4, corpuscles; *alpha*, *beta*, light quanta; *delta*, electrons; *gamma*, protons. As he goes on, we discover that —4, *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma*, and *delta* are in practically

the same class as —5, the main difference seems to be that the latter terms have been longer used. The assumption being that if we have a name we have a thing, and the longer we have used the name the more of a reality it becomes. He ingenuously suggests that our ignorance of this submicroscopic world may be due to our size since we appear to be geometrically midway between the giant stars and the corpuscles. This kind of scientific suggestion strikes us quite as cold as the importance Miss Saxe once attached to the middle verse of the middle chapter of the middle of the King James Bible about which all revelation was supposed to be built as a center. That is, we have now exchanged theological for scientific twaddle. Nor do we feel the full assurance of faith in our scientific guide into the meaning of corpuscles to be told that "the knowledge concerning them has grown so rapidly in recent years that now we know practically nothing about them." We admire the author's honesty, but can scarcely respect his sense of humor, since he continues to tell us more of the unknown to the end of the chapter. Humor would have helped too to save him from the attempt to avoid definition in a scientific treatise. He prefers not to define "system" in the hope that "a definition may be inferred rather than explicitly stated." Such mysticism would have done credit to Jacob Boehme. Furthermore the author refuses to say what he is going to mean by the term "matter." He admits ignorance also of sub-class *alpha* but adds, "Undoubtedly it is a highly important class in the universe." He then resorts to a characteristic scientific subterfuge:

But it is not very daring to predict that when we have, in a few years, more stable knowledge concerning light quanta and electrons we shall be able to fill in sub-class *alpha* without hesitation.

After so great an act of faith we are, of course, not astonished to learn that "corpuscles are indeed at the heart of modern astrophysics." In other words we can let $x=0$ and $y=0$ but we know perfectly well what the sum of x and y may be. All mysteries are solved since we have established names for our various ignorances. Thus we are assured that "the material systems of higher orders are built up of two types of corpuscles, the proton and the electron." Apparently the greater the ignorance the greater the ease of fabricating our scientific structure out of our "electronic and protonic bricks." Verily there has not been such great faith in words since the palmy days of the Medieval Realists who declared a name to be a thing.

The remainder of the book deals with the recently discovered facts of astronomy and has every right to be classed as scientific and in keeping with the very great scientific reputation of its author. But our scientists must, we suppose, cling to the ancient dogma of Bruno, which at the present time is the hall-mark of scientific respectability, that in the universe there is nothing so mean nor so unimportant as man.

R. T. F.

Aesthetic Materialism

THE REALM OF MATTER: Book Second of Realms of Being, by
 GEORGE SANTAYANA. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1930.
 Pp. xv, 209. \$3.50.

It hardly needs saying, but will bear repeating, that Professor Santayana's new book is marked by all the literary grace and felicity of phrase for which its author is justly renowned; nor will it occasion surprise that his latest volume also should contain a reaffirmation of his well-known doctrines. He upholds in it his enigmatical and tantalizing amalgam of a materialist metaphysic with a pragmatist account of action, with an aesthetic contemplation of "essences," with a refined skepticism, and, last but not least, with an incredibly robust "animal faith." Their fusion in his personal philosophy does not seem to me to have grown less psychological in this volume. It is perhaps a feeling that his synthesis remains logically unconvincing that tinges his autobiographical asides with melancholic resignation, and leads him to compare it to a spider's web (p. 135), tenacious and pertinacious, and pleasing to its author, but in neither case likely to be missed when he has passed away. On his own showing, he was hardly entitled to hope for more: for is it not the sum of his message that essence and reason are impotent, understanding everything but grasping nothing, and revealing only the grandeur and desolation of the cosmic landscape?

If existence is a surd (p. 27) and radically mad (p. 155) and its end-all and be-all, all-creative matter (p. 100), is unintelligible (p. 57) and unfathomable (p. 200), why should any one strain his animal faith to swallow Santayana's doctrines? His eagerness to show that all other philosophies also end in the triumph of materialism too much resembles the persuasiveness of the fox who had lost his tail. But even if one could grant him that matter is as good a principle as any other to account for the *past* of the present posture of affairs, might he not have learnt from William James that the effective meaning of a metaphysical doctrine lies in its promise for the *future*? It may be, as James says, that the world is what it is whether its origination be credited to matter or to God: but are these two hypotheses equally indifferent as regards the future? On this vital question Santayana is strangely silent.

To touch on minor matters, I was glad to note that Santayana uses "humanism" in a very wide sense, for what used to be called, more clumsily, "anthropomorphism" (p. 201). But I was a little surprised to find that on p. 172 he relied on *habits* to support his naturalism. He says, "spirits and laws, for a natural philosopher, are simply names bestowed humanly on the habits of bodies." But how do we learn that bodies are capable of acquiring habits? Surely habits as the source of uniform behavior are nowhere to be directly apprehended save in personal experience. It is much more difficult than naturalists are wont to realize to depersonalize completely our

categories of explanation. In conclusion, I would like to express a parting wish that, "like the gods of Epicurus in the interstices of the world" (p. 1), Professor Santayana may long continue to exploit the privileged position he enjoys, to the enrichment of philosophic literature.

F. C. S. S.

Studies in Ethics

READINGS IN ETHICS, edited by GORDON H. CLARK and T. V.

SMITH. F. S. Crofts and Co., N. Y. 1931. Pp. x, 401. \$3.00.

AFTER TWO THOUSAND YEARS, by G. LOWES DICKINSON. W.

W. Norton and Co., N. Y. 1931. Pp. 213. \$2.00.

So long as professors persist in the attempt to teach philosophy by means of its history there will presumably be a market for source-books of illustrative material, and these will have to be highly selective, like anthologies. Nor is it to be expected that the selections of any one, or even of two or three (for Dr. F. P. Clarke is responsible for the chapter on medieval ethics in this book), will meet with universal approbation from any one else, and criticism will naturally take the form of suggestion that better selections might have been made. That, accordingly, is what I shall venture to do in the case of this manual. The principles on which the selection has been conducted strike me as unduly academic, and too narrowly conventional. I fear that the chief impression they will generate or confirm in the undergraduate mind is that ethics is a very dismal science, very dry and dull stuff, discoursing endlessly and repetitiously on artificial and fictitious problems, but having very little regard or relation to the practical realities of life. Now it may be that there is considerable ground for this impression, but still the historical contribution of ethics to culture is not wholly exhausted by the discussion of such questions as What is the good?, Is man selfish?, Is hedonism true?, Is duty absolute?, or even, Is the Stoic or the Aristotelian sage, the hermit or the saint, a better model for the average man? The pressing questions that naturally arise in a young man's life when he goes to college are rather such as these: Why should I not do as I please? Why should I submit to social custom? When may I rebel? How can I reform, myself or others? What ought I to do in hard cases when duties conflict, when laws oppress, when social opinion seems corrupt or debased? Such questions may lead on to deeper issues like: Am I really responsible? Is my will free? and even, Is life worth living? Yet there is little or nothing in these *Readings* that will seem to bear on any of them.

Passing to details, the selections from Plato are not bad, though it should have been explained that the Socratic paradox, that voluntary wrong-doing is better than involuntary, was a correct deduction from the principle that virtue was knowledge and that the error in this principle was subsequently recognized both by Plato and by Aristotle. In view of what the authors state on p. 199, it is perhaps a pity that they did not substitute a selection from the *Euthyphro*

for the one from the *Philebus*, especially as they have administered such heavy doses of hedonistic controversy from Epicurus, Bentham, T. H. Green, and Henry Sidgwick. The selections from the *Nicomachean Ethics* I do not admire. The Mean, no doubt, could not be circumvented, but room might at least have been found for the sanity of Aristotle's theory of pleasure, and his remarks on "incontinence" were surely more appropriate than those on the theoretic life. But I suppose their glorification of the professor will always form an irresistible temptation for the academic mind; which is the reason also why they are prescribed to the Oxford Passmen in "Group A1"! The thirteenth chapter of the *Corinthians* should not have been omitted from the specimens of Christian ethics, and bits of the *Imitatio Christi* would have been more stimulating than the labored pseudo-Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas. In the selections from Kant *du sollst* should not have been translated "you must," and the connexion between the three great postulates of God, Freedom and Immortality should have been made clear. I cannot but think that F. H. Bradley's *Ethical Studies* could have provided a brighter and better representation of Hegelian ethics than T. H. Green, and am surprised to find G. E. Moore's verbal analyses figuring as scientific ethics to the extent of 26 pages. Why are Herbert Spencer and Leslie Stephen totally omitted? Chapter X of Dewey's *Quest for Certainty* does duty for "evolutionary ethics"; but it will probably be found too hard by students, and a more attractive selection could have been taken from *Human Nature and Conduct*. Lastly, where are Confucius and Buddha and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche? Their inclusion would have diversified and enlivened proceedings not a little.

F. C. S. S.

To talk over modern ethical problems with Plato after two thousand years; what a daring literary idea! Perhaps only Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, of all contemporary literati, would have the grace and scholarship, and, shall we say, temerity, to attempt such a feat. In his two party dialogue, *After Two Thousand Years*, Philaethes is the typical modernist who, in the Elysian Fields, thinks Plato into his present and carries on a dialogue which covers the whole gamut of modern social problems: property, riches, poverty, democracy, socialism, population, birth control, the white man's burden and the black man's menace, war, science, art, love, and immortality. The most recent and most interesting attempt of the English man of letters to apply Platonism to the problems which confront the Englishman, as also the rest of the world.

The subtle and true insight of Mr. Dickinson is expressed in the way Plato counters the enthusiasm of Philaethes for the modern boast of scientific and material progress: what is the increase of true goods? "Goods" to the modern are things, which we have created in such profusion as to stagger the Platonic imagination, and which we have concentrated in such masses on the one hand and along side

of such poverty on the other hand as the Greek world never knew. Has industrialism created, or science revealed, any increase of intrinsic goods other than that beauty, truth, and love ennobled in Plato's philosophy?

Mr. Dickinson, like the good modern, is not merely content with letting Plato speak to our problems. He must set the Greek sage right on some of his famous principles. Perhaps the most important theoretical discussion in the book is the section on art where the modern doctrine of art for art's sake is pitted against Plato's insistence that art must be subordinated to moral ends. The relentless logic of Plato is not shaken, but such is the absurdity of logic that he is made to say that he would exclude Shakespeare and George Bernard Shaw out of the Republic. Yet there is a disturbing force in the caustic comment of Plato after the report concerning the developments in modern music:

You do not surprise me, for long ago I came to the conclusion that your society is democratic in its taste, as in its politics. And your science no doubt enables it to gratify its preferences, if it is as potent in inventions that destroy the soul as it is in those that destroy the body (157-158).

The fundamental clash between Modernism and Platonism is put into the response of Philaethes to Plato's demand for censorship in art. That demand presupposes an ideal perfection; modern philosophy holds that

Good and Evil can never be finally and securely known, but must be perpetually discovered and rediscovered . . . For granting, I would say, that your philosopher-kings could be put into power, and that they knew Good perfectly and truly, and introduced their censorship to preserve it uncontaminated, yet still I should say they would be defeating their own object, or at any rate mine. For what I would wish to create is not men like statues, beautifully shaped for someone else to contemplate, but living creatures, choosing Good because they know Evil (166).

References to the influence of Christianity on the moral tradition are mostly uncomplimentary and certainly not without unfair bias. It is curious to note that while theological modernists point to the inimical influence of Greek rationalism and foment a "back to Jesus" movement, here is a modernist who would lead a "back to Plato" movement. The answer, surely, is to recover and preserve the truth of both.

This modernization of the Platonic dialogue form displays all the weakness of the modern literary art by comparison. Everything is done up in thimble-full proportions, sometimes even that is a little scanty. Philaethes reports how it is *After Two Thousand Years*; there is a brief comparison with Plato's Greece, and Plato makes a cryptic remark. There is none of that leisurely play of dialectic which both delights and confounds the reader of Plato himself. But

the book makes a delightful introduction to ethics by sketching a bird's-eye view of the total ethical situation today on the background of Platonic idealism. Seeing clearly the difficulties which the modern mind must find in Plato, Mr. Dickinson also catches the glimpse of the Platonic vision which, perhaps, this age needs to recover. Witness the parting words of Plato:

But do you conceive, you little men, that the subtle fire of life can inhabit no other integuments than those that so grossly close you in? Or that senses so few and crude as those you possess can prescribe how higher souls may live and have their being? No! the world is full of gods, ascending the golden stairs, although your feeble vision cannot see them . . . For the whole universe groans and travails together to accomplish a purpose more august than you divine; and of that, your guesses at Good and Evil are but wavering symbols. Yet dark though your night be and stumbling your steps, your hand is upon the clue. Nourish then your imagination, strengthen your will and purify your love. For what imagination anticipates shall be done, and what love seeks shall be revealed (212-213). ALBION ROY KING

Religion in Theory and Practice

RELIGION AND THE TRANSCENDENT, by GEORGE GALLOWAY. The University of London Press, London. 1930. Pp. viii, 151. 4s. 6d.

WHICH WAY RELIGION? by HARRY F. WARD. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. 221. \$2.00.

In this volume we have the three lectures which Dr. Galloway delivered in May, 1929, at King's College, London. They deal with "The Transcendent In Religious Experience," "The World Order and The Transcendent," and "The Philosophical Justification of The Transcendent." There are also two long notes on "The Natural Order, Mind, and the Transcendent," and "Immortality and The Transcendent."

It is a well known fact that almost all modern Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion which occupies a prominent place in the world's thought has developed a doctrine of the Immanence of God—Deity or Absolute—and neglected Transcendence. One need only recall the variety of schools of thought and various methodological approaches to the problems of philosophy represented by such great names as Spinoza, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bradley, and S. Alexander to be aware of this truth. With the possible exception of Aristotle, who overemphasized the matter, no great thinker did justice to the Transcendence of God before the arrival of modern Theistic Personalism, to which school Dr. Galloway belongs. Those who feel that philosophy should be systematic and comprehensive will welcome these lectures as a double antidote to the recent overemphasis on Immanence and the deadening effect of overworked analyses of particular situations worked out by many modern Realists.

This small volume is an almost perfect illustration of the fact that the value of a work is not to be judged by its bulk, for it contains the essence of modern thought on the problem of Transcendence, without neglecting the meaning and value of Immanence. Since it is thus rich and comprehensive, the reviewer can only indicate some of the interesting aspects of the problem.

The first of these to be noted is the drawing out of the element of Transcendence in "primitive religion"—the emphasis on *mana*, *orenda*, etc., i.e., the *numen*—and in historic religions. One finds here in the most compact form imaginable a careful psychological and historical study of "the transcendence of the object of worship." And the author goes on to point out that this "object of worship" is never attributeless. But dimly outlined in the beginnings of religion it takes on ethical attributes which come to be looked upon as having their source in it. As "object of worship" it is in all stages of religious life—vaguely defined at first, so far as intellect alone is concerned, but growing in intensity and clearness—not merely object, or even ethical object, for it is in the third place the means of deliverance from all that man wishes to overcome; which is to say that it is the gift which comes from above through "the illuminating power . . . felt within."

But in addition to these psychological factors which are in some degree common in all religion there emerges in mature thought the Transcendent as the one satisfactory explanation of the facts brought to light by the sciences. It is in this connection that the author furnishes us with excellent discussions on purpose, freedom, the Good, etc., as he points out the inadequacy of Naturalism.

It is the concluding discussion—that which comes "when the restricted outlook of science widens into the synoptic view of philosophy"—that has most interest for the metaphysician. Beginning with an analysis of the epistemological problem, Dr. Galloway finds reasons for rejecting extreme Idealism and radical Realism, concluding with a view which has at least once been called "Spiritualistic Realism," and which recognizes unity and structure in the objective world without denying the supreme place of mind. As is but natural this discussion grows into one concerning the nature of the self—is it substantial or adjectival in its relation to God? And the book concludes with a discussion of Pantheism and Deism, or Immanence and Transcendence, in which Dr. Galloway points out how the Theistic notion of a Personal God solves all the difficulties involved; for "faith directs itself to a Reality which is Transcendent" and "To value this world aright our vision must extend beyond it."

TOM H. TUTTLE

Religion today, as in the middle ages, finds its chief opponent in a secular imperialism, thinks Harry F. Ward, and he speaks for all those who conceive the central function of religion as socio-ethical; only now the church is not so unified and centralized and the im-

perialism is an economic imperialism which is founded upon the capitalistic political dogma that governments exist mainly for the defense of property rights. During the war religion was reduced to abject submission to the state, when the whole machinery of the church was prostituted to the creation of that "self-deceiving idealism" without which men cannot be made to fight modern imperialistic wars. Since the war the sinister alliance between industrialists and militarists has shown its determination to keep the church in subjection, blacklisting pacifists, restraining free speech, repressing civil liberties, denying citizenship to conscientious objectors, and threatening reprisals against expensive economic enterprises of the church. And such has been the moral impotence of the church, as a result, that, while she was so busily engaged in extracting the new war-won gold from the industrialists to build magnificent cathedrals, she could not muster enough moral force to pass a child labor law, or organize an effective protest against the inevitable post-war plundering of the public treasury and natural resources.

Which Way Religion? There is first the revival of theology. The new science has opened a vast field for cosmic speculation and has brought a new interest in the problem of God. Have we lost our way among the stars, and forgotten that the only true God ever discovered by the religious soul is He who speaks in the moral conscience? Whitehead and Karl Barth have offered us ways of escape from the moral pessimism that has engulfed the world, one into a realm of cosmic scientific æstheticism, and the other into a super-rational transcendentalism.

Then there is the revival of ritualism and the cult of the Gothic. On this Ward must be quoted:

The plain fact remains that our Gothic revival expresses only the aspiration of those who have the money to pay for it, and that is a limited circle even within the household of faith. . . . Thus curiously enough, capitalistic industrialism in a supposedly democratic era has managed to reverse the situation of the feudal days which produced the Gothic it now imitates. Then authority was rigidly stratified. But, while there was separation of social and political status, there was community in worship. Now there is community in political status but growing separation in worship. . . . The physical and social barriers are impassable save for an insignificant few. . . . According to the laws of history, which this generation may too late discover to have that dread certainty which their forefathers ascribed to the laws of God, these structures are insecure to the extent to which injustice has entered their foundations. Therefore, it is historically certain that, unless they are used to transform the economic conditions which made them possible, to those who will finally accomplish that transformation neither their beauty

nor their religion will make any more appeal than did that of the Russian churches to the Bolsheviks or that of England's cathedrals to Cromwell's troopers.

Along with this liturgical emphasis there is a growing inclination toward mysticism, "without the vow of poverty," all of which, Ward suggests, is an attempt "to possess God as well as the goods and powers of this world," even a move to transform the God of faith into a Master Robot, the hireling of a class, just as Nature has been thus transformed through science by the acquisitive society.

During the war Walter Rauschenbush was borne down to the grave, crushed in the collapse of the social ideal he had proclaimed as a prophet. During those dreadful days of spiritual exile there was a remnant who did not bow the knee to Baal. The mantle of Rauschenbush fell on Harry Ward, then at Boston. In his two recent books, *Our Economic Morality*, written in 1928 before the economic crash, and the book under review, Ward appears as one of the most incisive critics of the contemporary scene in America. What Ward sees with the clear vision of a prophet is the contradiction of all that is fundamental to the spiritual and moral insight of the race in the current impersonalism, and impersonalism which is far more insidious in our economic individualism and the corrolary widespread moral anarchy in such matters as sex, than in the materialism of credal philosophies. Modern men *can* be religious, but the way is not to be found in any escape into rational theology or æsthetic mysticism: the program of religion must be based upon a clear recognition of the dangers of that impersonalism, and must provide a new personal and social creativity. In this it has a coördinate task with science and philosophy:

The quicker religion is content to leave to science and philosophy those aspects of the nature of man and the universe concerning which it formerly spoke with authoritative ignorance, the sooner it will be able to coördinate its work with theirs, prevent them from being unmoral or becoming immoral, and so help modern men to such wholeness of life and outlook as is now possible.

Such a salvation through social creativity Ward finds to be "the vital germ of good in the Great Russian upheaval, that human beings who have been little more than beasts of burden are now becoming conscious makers of a new society" (p. 73), though all implications of religion are disavowed. (The analysis of communism as a religion is one of the most interesting sections of the book). And he adds, "If your present institutional religion cannot function in this manner then a new form will arise to that end and it may not call itself religion at all."

As between the theological, liturgical, and ethical functions of religion, Professor Ward is quite right in insisting that the ethical is fundamental and definitive. Religion must provide a moral dynamic

for constant personal and social reconstruction. But he does not seem to appreciate fully the function of religion also in providing a way of escape, let us frankly call it, though this is commonly a term of opprobrium. The purpose of Jesus was ethical, let it be admitted; all his efforts were bent to the realization of the kingdom of heaven; yet the kingdom did not arrive, and death was the reward of his labors. Is not such a "Crisis" always the possible reward of ethical efforts? And is it not the purpose of religion to provide a means of escape by transcendence, the vision of God which keeps the martyr calm before Pilate? This defect seems to lead Ward, in spite of his insistence that theology and worship and ethics are not antithetic but complementary, to undervalue ritualism, and to underestimate the part Roman Catholicism may yet have in social reconstruction. (p. 181) What he would insist on, however, and rightly, is that there can be no escape from the moral struggle itself. The consolation of religion is always the faith and strength to die in the struggle. The justification of Gothic cathedrals is that they may engender the moral dynamic that will transform the economic system which has created them. We may even suggest that the justification of a great capitalistic foundation like Union Theological Seminary is that it supports the present chair of social ethics. The defense of religion is not to perfect its escape mechanisms but to release its moral dynamic upon the glaring social defects of our times.

Students commonly admit the incisiveness of Ward's criticism of the current situation, but hasten to add that he fails to offer a constructive program. The defect is one to which the author has recently addressed himself in a letter to *The Christian Century* (August 26), with much promise for his future leadership in that direction. He seeks to forestall the criticism by proclaiming that the preacher's business is not to prescribe methods but to proclaim principles. Laymen must work them out for moral progress, just as they work out scientific principles for material progress. But the difficulty has been that preachers have extolled the principles of Jesus and laymen have paid feeble lip-service with their tongues in their cheeks, assuming the impossibility of practical application. This implicit skepticism has recently come into the open with a direct challenge to the relevance of Jesus to our times. Ward addresses himself to that issue and points out that there has always been a resurrection of Jesus for every moral crisis. Then he compares the ethical religion of Jesus with the alternatives offered today: science, communism, nationalism, and prosperity. The latter is the real religion of Americans and the true Anti-Christ. "Unless a religion can arise that is vital enough to destroy the religion of prosperity which is even now capturing nationalism and enslaving science there is no future before the sons of men."

There are some indications of hurried composition to meet a passing occasion, but there is a maturity of reflection on the problems

and a sustained interest throughout, which mark this as Dr. Ward's best work, and will give it a lasting influence. Unfortunately the publisher has eliminated from the whole series of books to which this belongs all page titles and indices, necessary devices for permanent reference use. But the brevity and directness of the work leave no excuse for anyone not reading it through.

A. R. K.

The Scientific Study of Character

STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER, by HUGH HARTSHORNE and MARK A. MAY, in three volumes. Vol. I, *Studies in Deceit*. Book One, pp. xxi, 414; Book Two, pp. viii, 306. \$4.50. Vol. II, *Studies in Service and Self-Control*. Pp. xxiii, 559. \$2.75. Vol. III, *Studies in the Organization of Character*. Pp. xvi, 503. \$2.75. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1928, 1929, 1930.

These three volumes are the fruitage of researches done by Dr. Hartshorne and Dr. May under the auspices of the Character Education Inquiry of Teachers College, Columbia University and in co-operation with the Institute of Social and Religious Research of New York City. Volume III of the series of volumes had the assistance of Dr. Frank K. Shuttleworth.

These studies constitute a monumental piece of work that best marks the acceptance by this newest branch of education of distinctly scientific methods, to supplement the thoughtful, definitional and analytical methods conveniently employed. It is a significant landmark on the road to a more objective and technically effective way of handling the intricate and involved problems of personality and its cultivation. The signal triumph of the present time is the success now achieved in investigating organisms and all the types of phenomena that behave organismically. The time has gone by when men seriously attempt to understand cancer, for example, its causes and cure, by simply entertaining sober thoughts about it.

The first volume is given up largely to the study of deception, its nature, the situation provocative of it, and the possibilities of its correction. The early part of the volume is a useful critique of scientific method,—the use of quantitative data, objective tests of their reliability, validation of conclusions and prediction based on authoritative data. The types of deception studied were cheating, lying and stealing. The children studied were given twenty-two opportunities to cheat in class-room work, four opportunities in athletic contests, two in party games and one in school work done at home. About eleven thousand children, ages 8 to 16, were subjected to part or all of the test situations.

The results of the research are many and important. There is a definite answer, for example, to the much debated question of the value of a definite program of inculcation of morals. Two schools in New York City that had been administering medicated morals, were

placed against three schools that had left the children free from moral didactics. On almost all the counts the children to whom moral discipline had been administered made the worse showing. They were, furthermore, tested in the autumn and then again in the middle of the school year. The comparison showed that the half year of effort had brought negative results.

A constantly recurring principle shows throughout the studies with reference to moral "traits." Traits are special and not general. "Neither deceit, nor its opposite, honesty, are unified character traits, but are specific characters of life situations. Most children will deceive in certain situations and not in others. Whether a child will practice deceit in any given situation depends in part on his intelligence, age, home background and the like, and in part on the nature of the situation itself, and his particular relation to it."

Among the specific findings are the following: Older pupils are slightly more deceptive than the younger. Sex makes no difference in cheating. Girls have higher power of self-control against distractions. Children with emotional instability are more apt to deceive. Deceit is positively associated with economic status. A high cultural background of the home and the refined attitude of parents tend to lessen deceit. High deportment marks are associated with less cheating. The teacher influence of good-will and cooperation is an important factor in honesty and honor. Certain moral traits and attitudes tend to be characteristic of members of the same families.

If there is one criticism that might be brought to bear upon the report of these prodigious researches, it is that they are too voluminous. Page after page is given up to the tabulation of detailed data in which there is no significant difference in the types compared. A little skill in description might well have saved about one half the space.

There is entire escape in these studies from the evils of pseudoscience. It is not intimated that finally character education can become in toto of scientific nature. Quite the contrary. It is part of the victory of scientific method that it can demonstrate objectively its own limitations, point out the nature and extent of its incapacities and discover ways of obviating them.

In the Introduction we warned the reader against assuming that when we have tested conduct even in a large number of situations we have thereby tested character. We have not. Our tests of deception are not, as they stand, tests of character. All we have is a series of records of specific acts. Even when these records are highly prophetic of future acts of the same sort they are not to be taken as quantitative descriptions of character (I, 146).

Although measures of character are not possible, it must be admitted that most of the researches set forth in this compendium afford interesting insights into personality, its mechanisms and how it can be influenced.

EDWIN DILLER STARBUCK.

Guides to Thinking

- PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF RIGHT THINKING: A Textbook for Logic, Reflective Thinking, and Orientation Courses. Revised Edition. By EDWIN ARTHUR BURTT. Harper and Brothers, N. Y. 1931. Pp. xii, 529. \$3.00.
- NUMBER, THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE: A Critical Survey Written for the Cultured Non-Mathematician, by TOBIAS DANTZIG. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1930. Pp. xii, 260.
- THE BASIS OF BELIEF: Proof by Inductive Reasoning, by WILLIAM G. BALLENTINE. Thomas Y. Crowell Co., N. Y. 1930. Pp. 230. \$2.00.

Noted educators have said that the undebatable ought to be taught before the debatable. Mr. Burtt apparently has had this ideal before him in writing his textbook, inasmuch as he has endeavored to lay down the "principles of right thinking" as exemplified particularly in science before taking up such "problems of right thinking" as are concerned more prominently with evaluation. The objectives indicated in the subtitle are combined in a skilful manner. In a day and in a land in which the study of formal logic is despised, in which students have learned to look for kaleidoscopic entertainment in philosophy, and in which the rival merits of empirical, experimental, mathematical, humanistic, and other logics are debated, it is gratifying indeed to note the extensive concessions that have been made to formal logic. There is theoretical as well as practical value also in making explicit the stages of reflective thought in the solution of problems, although such an analysis cannot establish the validity of any one type of metaphysics as against any other. The impasse, however, in which the chapters on evaluation end points, not to the superiority of the negative attitudes favored on the whole, but rather to the distinction between fact and value (or whatever other terms may be used to designate the distinction) as a basic and deep-cutting distinction, whatever set of facts or values may be utilized in the articulation of particular views and attitudes. It is difficult to see why a knowledge of scientific method, with all its chastening of human fears and hopes, should necessarily issue in a tendency toward a pessimistic outlook any more than it can be expected to furnish, of itself, a justification for an optimistic faith. The account of the conflict between evolution and ultimate religious convictions fails to convince, because scientifically the theory of evolution, as a descriptive theory, implies neither "progress toward better things" nor the opposing cosmological speculation which it is interpreted as supporting (pp. 480-482).

On the other hand, the material offered in this book, also in the concluding part, is so abundant and so interestingly set forth as to provide an excellent basis for individual study and for class discussions and reports. Notable improvements have been made upon

the original edition in pedagogical arrangement, accuracy of statement, economy of style, and the inclusion of additional material. There is every reason to believe that this popular contribution to logic, the best of the combined "reflective thinking" and orientation type, will enhance an interest not only in its own field, but also in philosophy in general.

RICHARD HOPE.

By using the historical method "to bring out the rôle intuition has played in the evolution of mathematical concepts," Professor Dantzig has written an interesting and instructive study of the part played by the idea of Number in the development of human culture. It is adorned with eleven portraits of eminent mathematicians, and should do much to disabuse the lay mind of its naïve faith in the infallibility of mathematicians and the rigor and exactness of their reasonings. In the light of history this belief is simply a superstition. On the philosophic implications of mathematics the book is not quite so satisfactory. Professor Dantzig duly notices the epic struggle at present going on between the "formalists," who would identify mathematics and logic, and the intuitionists, represented by Kronecker, Poincaré, Brouwer, Weyl and Borel, on the vital question of the legitimacy of the actually infinite (pp. 225-9). He himself refrains from taking sides, but his very interesting final chapter on the philosophy of mathematics does not appear to be wholly consistent. On the one hand it urges a number of pragmatic considerations as bearing on the truth of mathematics; on the other, it declares that "the concept of infinity is not an experiential nor a logical necessity; it is a *mathematical necessity*" (p. 247), and that "logic has no existence independent of mathematics" (p. 245). Yet we also hear of "the frigid, immobile, and barren rocks of logic" (p. 248), and are told that "*the indefinite repetition of an act . . . may be pure fiction, but it is a convenient and therefore a necessary fiction*" (p. 247). This looks as if Professor Dantzig had got rather seriously entangled in the many ambiguities of the word "necessary."

F. C. S. S.

Mr. William Ballentine's *Basis of Belief* emphasizes observation as the only means of extending knowledge, and takes up the various types of inductive thinking based on experience and experiment. Thus, observation is the key to "primary" inductions, to "secondary" ones, and to "mixed" ones. Primary induction is described as a direct generalization of a number of instances. It is no mystery, accordingly, but a mere recording of the fact that "lines of uniformity exist" (34). Knowledge "that the bridge is standing over the river and that the water is running under the bridge" are examples (35). Secondary inductions combine the generalization secured in primary induction with an inference from a single observation. Direct observation (primary induction) reveals the fact, says Mr. Ballentine, that specific gravities are constant. It also reveals the specific gravity of some

newly discovered metal, for example. By a secondary induction we may therefore affirm the specific gravity of all pieces of this metal. Mixed inductions are the conclusion of a syllogism based on a "truth of reason" and a specific fact.

The author holds that emphasis on observation will solve Mill's problem as to why we are certain of single observations in some cases and dubious of multiple ones in other cases. The reason, according to Mr. Ballentine, is that observation (primary induction) is invariably at the root of belief. It is, to be sure, a primary induction that "all swans are white," but there is another primary induction, much broader, that must qualify the other. This is that color in birds may vary. That all swans are white is correct in certain areas, but inclusion of broader territories may drive us back to the broader induction that color changes in birds. Chemical generalizations are not essentially different, as Mill thought, but are parts of at least possibly broader generalizations, a contention borne out by the changing conceptions of chemistry.

Mr. Ballentine lives in a reassuringly common-sense world in which there are things and persons as well as events. In his discussion of causation he disengages the time order from the energetic order and makes facts of succession secondary to facts of causation. His discussions of cause are too lengthy for full mention here, but make up one of the best parts of the book.

All the logical factors lend themselves to (and for Mr. Ballentine give fresh ground for holding to) what may be termed some orthodox tenets and arguments of theism. The physical world is regarded as conditioned and determinate. The human will, however, is seen as cause; while the chief problem raised by the will is the nature of personality. The freedom of the self is affirmed by the author as an observation or experience that is definite and virtually unquestionable. Likewise, in his final chapter on "Proof" the author affirms that the existence of God is as scientific and logical an object of belief as believing in the existence of one's mother (224). If this seems dogmatic to some readers, they may at least welcome the type of argument that makes the proof of God a simple induction, free from unwieldy reasoning and close to the heart of man.

The book should undoubtedly stimulate interest in belief and evidence, and so should add to a perception of the need for clear thinking. This is an important task.

C. F.

Miscellaneous

A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF VALUE, by MARY EVELYN CLARKE. The University of London Press, London. 1929. Pp. vii, 322. 7s. 6d.

It is Miss Clarke's contention that philosophy is not merely unifying the results of the various sciences; it is not altogether synthetic, it is also analytic. That contemporary philosophy is becoming more analytic is shown by the growing opposition to Objective Idealism.

Having stated her general position and the method she is to employ, Miss Clarke offers in so many chapters expositions and criticisms of what she takes to be the five principal kinds of value theories; concluding her book with a sixth chapter on the metaphysical implications of her objective theory. Within the space of a review one cannot hope to do justice to the richness and variety in such a book as this, and I therefore offer a few remarks on each of her chapters.

1. It is "the confusion of logical with psychological issues which seems to be the principal source of confusion in the theory of value today." And this confusion has its roots in the failure to understand the nature of logic, *i.e.*, that logic is the study of the forms of thought and not—as Dr. Schiller and Professor Baldwin seem to think—the laying down of practical rules to give directions for correct thinking. Such sophistries Miss Clarke calls "Psychologismus"—and notes their opposition to logic in that they make logic a division within psychology, and also because, being completely subjective, they confuse the psychological question of genesis with the logical question of validity. The fact is that the psychical activity of valuing tells us nothing concerning that about which the activity is employed. These are the most vacuous theories of value.

2. In "Affective Theories of Value" the psychological bias is said to be less obvious. One finds here an analysis of the views of Meinong, Ehrenfels, and Urban, who emphasize in the order given "feeling," "desire," and "a third dimension of feeling." All such theories are subjective in that they neglect the objective factors in value situations, and place the emphasis on feeling. In this connection Miss Clarke's contentions that judgment is not to be reduced to feeling and that value cannot be reduced to qualitative variation in feeling, carry great weight. She tells us:

I know that sugar-plums exist, and jazz-bands, and merry-go-rounds, and there are times when the existence of all these gives me genuine pleasure, yet I do not regard them as valuable, for "our pleasure in an object is not itself value experience" (82).

3. With the value theories which identify themselves with "interest" Miss Clarke shows more sympathy than with those previously discussed. In this chapter one finds a careful analysis of the position of Professor R. B. Perry. What she objects to is the notion of "the evolution of value" and the emphasis on "interest." Value is for her something that just is and is not the product of a process or an attitude of mind.

4. Professors John Dewey and S. Alexander are taken as the outstanding figures in the group which looks upon "Value As a Subject-Object Determination." The principal difficulty which Miss Clarke finds with Dewey's theory—p. 154—is his failure to make specific what he "believes 'valuity' to be a quality of." She feels that Dewey places great emphasis on situation value in opposition to actual

value, and that he therefore neglects the real nature of value because of a primary interest in valuation. Dewey does not make it clear whether he considers value (a) objective in things and known through liking, or (b) a quality of the total subject-object relation. In the case of Professor Alexander there is a complete denial of the subjectivity of value. Unlike Dewey he makes no attempt to have it both ways, but he does not look upon value as a quality of the thing valued. For him value is not in either the subject or the object, but in "*a subject-object determination*." It is Miss Clarke's opinion that had Professor Alexander maintained this position his theory would be difficult to criticize, but the fact is that he spends much time representing value as belonging first to one side and then the other. And this goes to show that while there are difficulties in both the subjective and objective theories of value they are not overcome by an attempt to amalgamate them.

5. The last group of value theories discussed includes those classified as "objective." It is with the members of this group—B. Russell, G. E. Moore, and others—that Miss Clarke identifies herself. Here she states and defends her thesis—p. 193—that it has been her principal aim . . . to exhibit the fallacy contained in the widespread belief that value involves a valuing process, an *object* of value being always an object that is valued by *somebody*. I do not, [she continues] of course, dispute the obvious truth that it is through valuing that we become aware of value. I am merely arguing that it is related to valuing in the same way as any universal is related to any act of awareness.

The whole of this chapter is eminently worth reading, all the more so because it gives a detailed picture of the struggle going on in contemporary thought with reference to *internal* and *external* relations. In her answer to subjective arguments Miss Clarke tells us—p. 210—that although there are

objects of value realized in persons, they are not values only for those persons. It must be apparent to any impartial critic that they are things which ought to be.

For her, then, value just is, we cannot discuss its positive side, and it is not definable. We must recognize it as simple and not as supernatural. It is just such a simple notion and just as easy to comprehend as is yellow or hard, and must be accepted just as we accept these. If we do not always so recognize good it is because (a) it is bound up in a complex object, or (b) we are dealing with an instrumental rather than an immediate object. But Miss Clarke does not distinguish intrinsic and instrumental value, values do not differ in *kind*, although objects may differ in the amount of value they possess.

An interesting and—to the present reviewer at least—novel aspect of Miss Clarke's theory is her discussion concerning *existence* and *subsistence* of value. She contends that value is a real which exists,

though not in a physical way, and that not to exist as physical is not necessarily to be subsistent.

6. So long as she examines the principal contemporary theories of value Miss Clarke is at her best, but the weaknesses of her work come out in her concluding chapter on "Some Metaphysical Implications of The Theory Defended." Here it becomes apparent that the author is no more in sympathy with, or has no more knowledge of, metaphysics than the self-styled philosophical "Humanists." The fact is that her strength lies in her ability as a critic rather than in constructive thinking. As a review of theories of value her work is powerful in both exposition and criticism, but when she tells us that since values "are demonstrably independent of our appreciation, we must regard them as real and valid within the limited range of their application," we see that she refuses to enter the realm of metaphysics. She cuts her analysis short because it suits her so to do. At no time does she consider the full implication of her theory or answer the logic of Personalistic Ethics, such as one finds in Sorley's "Moral Values And The Idea Of God." One cannot stop with particular values if one desires to enter metaphysics. Particular values are indexes to, pointer readings for, the nature of Reality. If abstract universals are not mere "as ifs"—as our author contends they are not—how can they be real except as expressing the creative activity of The Divine Spirit? The very objectivity for which Miss Clarke contends implies a creator of reals. Realism always requires a theistic basis—whether it recognizes the fact or not—more than many forms of Idealism, for the latter can fall back on subjectivism and avoid religious and metaphysical problems, whereas Realism must acknowledge its logical conclusion—indicating the source of its reals—or, as most realists do (Miss Clarke being a good example), confine itself to a wearisome round of analysis, thus refusing to become in the strict sense of the term a philosophy.

T. H. T.

READINGS IN PSYCHOLOGY, by RAYMOND HOLDER WHEELER and others. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1930. Pp. x, 597. \$3.75.

Experimentalism has the day in psychology. Theoretical work is not obsolete, of course; but, as in the other sciences, it is rapidly coming to a minor place in the curriculum. *Readings in Psychology* brings together, in a single large volume, samples of experimental investigations and reports as source materials for introductory classes. The readings cover a wide and diverse field of subjects, arranged for this work, somewhat artificially, in the following groups: social behavior, intelligent behavior, emotive behavior, learning, reaction and observational behavior, and the nervous system. With one exception the readings are all the work of American psychologists in American universities, and they have mostly been published previously in the psychological journals. The editors preface each

chapter with an explanatory note and add a glossary of technical terms at the end; thus the work is rendered useful to beginners. In fact, the critic who is inclined to regard the experimental studies as too technical for college sophomores will be surprised at the clarity of exposition in the work as a whole.

Of the twenty-eight studies included in the work, five may be mentioned as typical, chosen for their special interest to the reviewer. Edith L. Cornell, of the New York State Department of Education, presents evidence for the modification of the I.Q. through social factors which tends to discredit the dogma of its constancy in a paper called, "Taking the Dogma Out of the I.Q." August Alpert of Teachers College, Columbia University, reports a series of experiments on pre-school children which repeat the famous situation-response technique used by Köhler on apes with significant results for pre-school education methods. A review of Dr. Henry Goddard's studies of the Norma-Polly case, an important recent addition to the literature of dual personality, is included. Dr. Goddard has an interesting, but highly speculative, explanatory theory which combines a neurological theory with the Gestalt notion. It is refreshing to see the problem treated without the usual talk of subconsciousness and repressions. One of the contributions, written especially for this work, is the "Photographing Artistic Voices" by Dr. Milton Metfessel of the University of Southern California, who has developed original experimental procedures in phonophotography with the aid of motion pictures. With this method he has demonstrated the near universality of a vibrato in artistic voices, and he employs the principle of Gestalt to explain the differences in taste between the popular audience and the trained musician in this matter. One important reading is not experimental, but is rather a summary of all the theories of perception. It is a paper on "The Nature and Problem of Perception" by Henry Helson of Bryn Mawr, also written especially for this work. All of the chapters deal with questions of human interest which ought to have value far beyond academic circles.

A question arises from a survey of this book concerning the results of the experimental approach to psychology. The studies are detached and fragmentary. Some unity is indeed supplied by the consistent presentation of the Gestalt point of view in the brief editorial notes. The difficulty attends the application of scientific method in the teaching of any field, but is especially vivid in psychology. What will be the results when our students learn the principles of mind and behavior from a laboratory manual? Will it be our aim to turn out technicians who can use the galvanometer and compile copious statistical tables? Will they also learn to value and respect personality? Or will they be specialists who flit from one situation to another, dragging their instruments of precision, and missing the true value of the whole? Perhaps if the Gestalt principle is carried far enough, there need be no fear.

A. R. K.

GREY HEATHER, by SALLY BRUCE KINSOLVING. The Mosher Press, Portland, Maine. 1930. Pp. 90.

This beautiful volume is flavored with the briny tang of the sea and surcharged with the philosophy of a poet drawing inspiration from salt marshes and the seasonal pilgrimage of birds of passage. Such themes, to be sure, are not the only ones among the eighty lyrics and sonnets here collected, but they recur constantly. Many of the verses have appeared in poetry journals, while readers of *The Personalist* may recall the lines entitled "Shelter."

The reader cannot fail to be impressed with Sally Bruce Kinsolving's competent handling of any standard verse form. Though she employs crisp iambic quatrains frequently, it is surprising how often she achieves a diversified effect by varying the expected metrical scheme. There are occasions, it must be admitted, where one is tempted to feel irritation at apparent carelessness, but these instances are happily rare.

C. F.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- THE REVELATION OF DEITY, by J. E. TURNER. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. 223. \$2.75.
- THE ENDURING QUEST: A SEARCH FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE, by H. A. AVERSTREET. W. W. Norton and Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. xii, 283. \$3.00.
- WE IMPERIALISTS: Notes on Ernest Seilliere's Philosophy of Imperialism, by CARGILL SPRIETSMAN. Columbia University Press, N. Y. 1931. Pp. 153. \$1.50.
- THE THIRTEEN PRINCIPAL UPANISHADS, translated from the Sanskrit, by ROBERT ERNEST HUME. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, American Branch, N. Y. 1931. Pp. xvi, 588. \$6.00.
- BEHAVIOURISM: A SYMPOSIUM, by JOSIAH MORSE, WM. McDUGALL; CHAS. JOSEY, W. E. GARRISON, ROSS L. FINNEY, JULIUS MARK, RUFUS JONES and F. J. McCONNELL. The Student Christian Movement, London. 1931.
- COSMIC CONSCIOUSNESS, by RICHARD MAURICE BUCKE. E. P. Dutton and Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. 384. \$5.00.
- A NEW MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE: Principles of the Psychological Method in Its Application to Problems of Science, Religion and Art, by P. D. OUSPENSKY. Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y. 1931. Pp. xv, 554. \$7.50.
- THE ADVENTURE OF MANKIND, by EUGEN GEORG. Translated from the German by Robert Bek-Gran. E. P. Dutton and Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. xx, 325.
- LUCIAN, PLATO AND GREEK MORALS, by JOHN JAY CHAPMAN. Houghton, Mifflin Company, N. Y. and Boston. 1931. Pp. vi, 181. \$2.00.
- THE NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL, by J. W. OMAN. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. xiii, 506. \$3.00.
- PATHWAYS TO THE REALITY OF GOD, by RUFUS M. JONES. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. vii, 253. \$2.00.
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- ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONVERSION: An Outline of His Development to the Time of His Ordination, by W. J. SPARROW. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. ix, 276. \$3.50.
- PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF RIGHT THINKING, Revised Edition, by EDWIN ARTHUR BURTT. Harper and Brothers, N. Y. 1931. Pp. xiii, 529. \$3.00.

- POLICY AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS, by CARL F. TAEUSCH. McGraw-Hill Book Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. 624. \$5.00.
- THE PACIFIC, by STANLEY ROGERS. Thomas Y. Crowell Publishing Company, N. Y. 1930. Pp. viii, 250. \$2.75.
- GOD AND THE UNIVERSE, Edited with an Introduction by J. LEWIS MAY, Lincoln MacVeagh, The Dial Press, N. Y. 1931. Pp. 209. \$2.50.
- MARIE LOUISE, NAPOLEON'S NEMESIS, by ALEXANDER MAHAN. Thos. Y. Crowell, N. Y. 1930. Pp. xi, 376. \$3.75.
- THE DAWN OF LITERATURE, by CARL HOLLIDAY. Thos. Y. Crowell, N. Y. 1931. Pp. x, 367. \$3.50.
- THE THEORY OF DRAMA, by ALLERDYCE NICHOLL. Thos. Y. Crowell, N. Y. 1931. Pp. 262. \$2.50.
- CONCENTRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, by HARRY W. LAIDLER. Thos. Y. Crowell, N. Y. 1931. Pp. ix, 501. \$3.75.
- THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, by EDWARD LINDSEY. Thos. Y. Crowell, N. Y. 1931. Pp. ix, 347. \$3.75.
- DID HOMER LIVE? by VICTOR BERARD. E. P. Dutton and Company, N. Y. 1931. Pp. 234.

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